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ABSTRACT

Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations (!GR)
saturates the academic study and practice of public
administration.

The two are combined into a structure of

government (federalism) and the flow of information and
instructions within that structure (!GR).

Forming a single

and complex theoretical approach to public administration,
they offer definition and clarification to the nature of
American government.

However, the approach is inherently

biased - as currently offered.

Deliberate or not, it

stresses the supremacy of each level of government over
A pyramid is

lesser units - a clear hierarchical structure.

often described with individual citizens as the foundation
and national government leadership at the apex.
This thesis offers another viewpoint and rebuffs the
current trend.

States are complex entities.

Although they

often act for the federal government, either as bureaucratic
intermediaries or allies; states retain the capability and
capacity to act independently.
The thesis offers three frameworks to assess state
operations.
thesis.

Two are familiar; the third is the basis of the

Resting upon the nature of 'autonomy' and

'intrusion,' the three help define relationships between the
federal and state government.

The first framework describes the state as a
bureaucratic entity.

States administer federal programs on

behalf of, and under the oversight and review of, the
national government.

The second refers to the state as a

federal government ally.

The state has some autonomy to

address its own concerns - yet remains junior to the federal
government.

The federal government still retains some

authority over the state.
The third framework goes beyond the focus upon the
federal government.

Rather, it sees the state as an

autonomous actor pursuing its own interest.

The federal

government does not possess authority over the state and
does not directly or indirectly influence state operations
(e.g., financial aid).

States establish, fund, operate, and

oversee programs and projects without federal interference.
Such state operations do exist.
This thesis demonstrates the applicability of the third
framework using the case study approach.

The Division of

Safety Inspection and Education (DSIE) of the Illinois
Department of Labor (IDOL) is used to define and clarify the
proposed framework.

The federal counterpart is the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) under
the US Department of Labor enacted under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970.
third framework.

DSIE operates under the

It is an autonomous operation - free of

federal interference, intrusion, and oversight.

DSIE is

maintained and funded solely from state revenue.
Although largely forgotten in the rush to focus upon
the national government; states remain a critical level of
government when meeting the needs and concerns of their
constituents.

States will take action alone and without

federal involvement or assistance.

States are still the

first bastions for change and will continue to serve this
function well into the future, a function they never lost.
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Chapter 1:
INTRODUCTION

The theory of federalism and intergovernmental
relations (IGR), as advocated by scholars such as Daniel J.
Elazar (1984) and Deil S. Wright (1988) or drawing upon the
works of other scholars such as David Osborne, is important
in the study of public administration. 1

Federalism

describes the structural organization of the different
levels of government within the federal system.

Elazar

(1984, p. 2) defines federalism as "the mode of political
organization that unites separate polities within an
overarching political system by distributing power among
general and constituent governments in a manner designed to
protect the existence and authority of each."
Intergovernmental- relations outlines the types and flows of
communication and relations within and between levels of
government.

It is the central group of interactions or

activities transpiring between the different types and
levels of government (Wright, 1988).

Combined, the two

offer scholars a theoretical perspective about government
structure and working relationships.

The theory, however,

contains a serious flaw.
The conceptual nature of federalism/IGR is founded upon
the relationship between the federal and state/local
governments.

The theory, whether intentional or not,

1

stresses the supremacy of each level of government over its
lesser units (e.g., federal over state and state over
local).

The theory, consequently, is biased because it

assumes a pyramidal arrangement with the federal government
at the top.

This causes confusion because of the normative

bias it creates and the empirical misperception which
results.

A REVIEW OF THREE MAJOR WRITERS

!GR is heavily dependent upon the structure of
federalism.

In federalism, the states are often portrayed

as subordinates of the central federal government.

The

relationship between state and federal government is
discussed in terms of the amount of autonomy the state
retains.

However much the proponents of federalism attempt

to separate the power of the various levels of government,
their case studies and explanations invariably portray a
pyramidal arrangement.

Daniel J. Elazar 2

Elazar's perception of federalism is one of federal,
state, and local governments working together (sometimes
with conflict) toward a common goal.

Further, he sees the

federal government responding to state desires (often

2

unstated) and compelling "errant" states to comply. Elazar
views this arrangement as a partnership.

Elazar (1984, p.

2) defines "federalism" as:
... the mode of political organization
that unites separate polities within an
overarching political system by
distributing power among general and
constituent governments in a manner
designed to protect the existence and
authority of both.
However, Elazar's attempt to apply this to cases within
his book, American Federalism; A View from the States (Third
Edition) (1984), demonstrates the subordination of the

states to the federal government.

For example, his

discussion of the issue of racial integration clearly shows
a strong central government directing state action (1984, p.
32-33):

The 1964 Civil Rights Act was the
turning point.
It represented, in
certain respects, a "treaty" between the
states and the federal government
providing for a formal reallocation of
power. The representatives of the
states "in Congress assembled" consented
to federal use of its powers to backstop
the efforts of those states willing to
exercise power to maintain the rights of
racial minorities - and to force the
states unwilling to do so to comply with
national constitutional standards.
Elazar (1984) seems to perceive the Congress working on
the behalf of the states in this passage.

However, the

members of Congress are not elected by state legislatures,
but by citizens within the districts the Congress persons
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represent.

It is difficult to believe representatives of

the states in opposition to forced compliance would support
such measures.
Congressional support is understandable when viewed as
the consequence of political pressures and public concerns
(e.g., special interest groups, public opinion, constituency
votes, campaign financial support, and party platform).
Political support determines the ability of elected
officials, Senators and Representatives in this case, to
remain in office.

Elected officials who ignore these

political realities risk their reelection to office.
The outcry following the murder of three civil rights
activists in Mississippi, deletion of voting restrictions
(e.g., poll taxes) with subsequent increased black political
participation, and the rise of public awareness, among other
factors, led to a federal interventionist role.

Busing and

affirmative action both sprang from the federal court system
and central federal government - not state action.

However,

Elazar's (1984) presentation erroneously leads the reader to
believe the federal action was supported by the states
through 'their' representatives in Congress.
Other Elazar (1984) cases, such as the federal
regulation of interstate commerce, similarly demonstrate the
power of the federal government and the subordinate role of
states.

Although Elazar uses his cases to argue the

presence of a federal/state partnership, another viewpoint

4

is discernible.

In Elazar's (1984) case of interstate

commerce, Congress gave authority to the states over
nationwide transportation and industrial systems within
state borders.

The states were unable to effectively deal

with the large interstate systems (e.g., railway) of the
post-Civil War period, especially in the face of hostile
rulings of the Supreme Court.

The railroads, for example,

would simply cut a state off from other states in
retaliation while the Supreme Court followed a
'constitutional dogmatism' limiting state power and favoring
laissez-faire (Elazar, 1984).
In a bureaucratic arrangement, however, the higher
authority grants subordinate authorities additional powers
to cope with new problems as they are encountered.

This is

an example of delegation of authority, an implied
characteristic of the attributes of bureaucracy espoused by
Max Weber (1958).

Hummel (1977) points to the first and

second bureaucracy attributes in which Weber (1958) declares
the authority of subordinate bureaucratic levels is defined
by rules and that there are levels of graded authority.
Hummel (1977, p. 80) states, " ... hierarchy means the clear
delegation of authority descending through a series of less
and less powerful offices ... "

The states, effectively, had

little authority over the nineteenth century interstate
systems until granted power by the federal government.

5

This

is a different picture than the partnership described by
Elazar (1984).
Elazar's (1984) discussion of the impact of special
interest groups fails to support his definition.

If the

states are viewed by the federal government as separate
polities with autonomous powers over internal issues,
Elazar's cases fail to convince.

Elazar's examples of

welfare reform and urban renewal are meant to demonstrate
the partnership of federal and state government.
however, to achieve his goal.

He fails,

Instead, he demonstrates how

the federal government is used by special interests to force
change upon the states and to provide these groups with
increased power within state capitals.
Special interest and reform groups, unable to force
state governments to ''drastically enlarge" programs, turned
to the federal government (Elazar, 1984, p. 40).

"They

turned to Washington for aid unobtainable from most of the
states, hoping through Washington they would become powerful
in their respective state capitals" (Elazar, 1984, p. 40).
They succeeded.

"Today the single-issue groups are trying

the same tactic" (Elazar, 1984, p. 41).

If states are not

subordinate to the federal government, and are equals in a
partnership (as Elazar frequently iterates), then his
examples fail to support a partnership arrangement.

His

cases show clear federal supremacy and authority over the
states - not partnerships.

6

Deil

s.

Wright

Deil S. Wright, another prominent writer on
!GR/Federalism, is similarly affected by the pyramidal
viewpoint.

Although Wright seemingly appears less

constrained, he nonetheless presents !GR and federalism
within the pyramid arrangement.

Wright's book,

Understanding Intergovernmental Relations (Third Edition)
(1988), also discusses federalism as a partnership between
the national and local governments.

Wright traces the

growth of !GR and federalism from the establishment of the
United States through the early Reagan administration's
years in office.

He notes the federal government

increasingly penetrates the realm of state responsibility
through regulations, preemption, financial support and
restrictions, cooptation, and professionalization of state
administrative structures (Wright, 1988).
The entire presentation rests upon the interaction of
federal with state and local governments.

These

interactions largely seem to result from the use of federal
authority to prescribe state administration of services,
programs, and financial aid (Wright, 1988).

Although not

Wright's intent, a reader is led to believe a state is not
an independent entity.

Rather a state is part of a larger

federal machine with some limited autonomy.

This limited

autonomy appears to exist in areas the federal government is
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not prepared or willing to administer due to low or nonexistent political pressures.
Wright (1988) informs us that federal intervention is
probable if, (1) there appears to be a nation-wide problem,
that is (2) not administered in the same manner from state
to state, (3) has the support of strong special interests or
the general populace, and (4) is politically advantageous.
The elements used by the federal government to enact change
range from influencing state decisions through financial
incentives/disincentives to mandated compliance.

This is

not a partnership with equal participants; rather the
federal government dominates the relationship.
Wright's cases offer the reader relationships in which
the federal government directs action or offers financial
assistance to induce states to make changes.

Non-compliance

by states when federal action is directed is of ten
accompanied by legal and/or criminal implications.

Whether

discussing urban renewal, welfare, highways, or hazardous
waste disposal, Wright (1988) shows the federal government
as the primary motivation for change.
Additionally, Wright shows how the federal government
becomes involved in state affairs through special interest
groups and political pressures.

His discussion of welfare,

civil rights, and urban renewal clearly demonstrates the
ability of special interests to directly approach the
federal government to direct and institute programs within

8

states.
D.

In each case, special interests lobbied Washington

c. to institute stronger programs than believed

achievable within the individual states.

Their approach to

Washington D.C. enabled the interests to obtain programs
cheaper than if they focused their attention upon the state
capitals (Wright, 1988).

David Osborne

Osborne's book, Laboratories of Democracy (1990), is a
study of how states are able to develop their economies.
The theme Osborne proposes is one in which the states
produce positive economic changes.

The book gives the

impression of the states forging economic change without the
participation of the federal government.

Osborne's book is

an attempt to portray states as independent actors.
Osborne's (1990) book is often cited by various writers
who emphasize the role of states as laboratories.

Osborne

is frequently quoted by authors who cite his case studies
to advance one aspect of the federal/state relationship.
Osborne's principal line of discussion offers the idea of
states as laboratories for applying new concepts and ideas.
From these laboratories, the federal government may extract
that which works to apply to national programs and policies.
Osborne's book seems to imply the states perform these
laboratory functions separate from the involvement of the

9

federal government.
his cases.

However, this is not substantiated by

Federal grants were used by Massachusetts,

California, Pennsylvania, and Arkansas to address areas of
concern and to implement programs for positive change.

For

example, New York used federal funds to explore new concepts
in low income housing, and Pennsylvania obtained federal
assistance to pursue the Ben Franklin Partnership as an
avenue for economic development (Osborne, 1990).
The arguments and cases of Elazar (1984), Wright
(1988), and Osborne (1990), reflect the limitations of the
current federalism/IGR theory.

The focus of Elazar and

Wright were upon a strong central federal government
operating within a weak state system.

The states are

portrayed as dependent upon the federal government for
resources and direction.

Osborne (1990) offers us a less

constrained view of the states.

States are able to develop

new programs to meet the needs of their constituencies.
Osborne's cases also demonstrate, however, the dependency of
the states upon the federal government.

The programs

outlined in his book succeeded because of state use of
federal resources.

IGR AND FEDERALISM

The theory of federalism and !GR depends upon two
components, autonomy and federal intrusion, to categorize a
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relationship between federal and state government(s).

The

two components, autonomy and federal intrusion, reflect the
amount of control and influence the federal government
exercises within a federal-state relationship.

The

applicability and validity of these elements, however, is
limited to relationships within which the federal government
is an active participant.

Elazar (1984), Wright (1988), and

Osborne (1990) use both elements to investigate and argue
their cases.
The elements of autonomy and federal intrusion are not
carried to their full range of application.

They are not

used to assess situations where the federal government is
absent and not a player in state programs.

There is a

continuum upon which the full range of autonomy and federal
intrusion can be represented. 3

At one extreme, there is

little or no state autonomy and federal intrusion permeates
the state organization to the lowest level of operation.
The states are essentially subordinates and functionaries of
the federal government.

States conducting autonomous

operations without federal intrusion are at the other
extreme.

Federal government assistance, aid, guidance,

requirements, oversight, and intrusion are absent.
state operates autonomously.

Between the two extremes,

states may be allies of the federal government.

The states

receive various types of assistance, financial and

11

The

technical, from the federal government.

In return, the

states pursue federal goals.

Autonomy

The first, autonomy, is advocated by Elazar (1984) and
Wright (1988) in their discussions of federalism and !GR.
Flawed as their cases are, the basic concept of autonomy is
essentially correct.

Autonomy is expressed in decision-

making capacities and policy implementation.

It is, in its

purest form and as relates to federalism/IGR, the ability to
pursue a desired program or policy independent and separate
of the federal government.
restricted, or absent.

Autonomy may be present,

The degree and type of autonomy is

key to the relationship between state and federal
government.
Almost every case presented by advocates of IGR and
federalism (Elazar (1984), Wright and White (1984),
Glendening and Reeves (1984), and Henig (1985)) assess
autonomy using three criterion.

These criterion establish

the level of state autonomy within federalism/IGR; (1)
financial structures, (2) regulatory requirements, and (3)
administrative constraints.
The first criteria is the existence of financial
structures.

Financial structures provide for financial

support, in some measure, of the state by the federal
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government.

The assistance may be in the form of grants,

aid programs, subsidies, revenue sharing, or other direct
and indirect financial ties.

The degree of financial

control is expressed in the amount of slack a state has in
the use of the federal purse.

According to Wright (1988, p.

201):
The central intent of federal assistance
is to alter the behavior, output,
programs, or decisions of state and
local governments. Indeed, federal
assistance often attempts to prescribe
within fairly narrow limits the choices
exercised by state or local officials.
The second criteria of autonomy is the nature of
regulatory requirements.

The federal government, as the

central government, is generally said to possess preemptive
authority over state/local governments.

Federal authority

has evolved into a complex and bewildering array of
regulations over the daily conduct of state/local government
and the lives of the citizenry.

The regulations range from

those associated with obtaining financial assistance through
the control of programs.
The amount of control the federal government exercises
is often associated with the amount of latitude permitted
the states within the structure of the governing regulations
and law; the length of the federal leash.

Wright (1988, p.

22) explains:
Federal agencies, 1:2y contracts and
grants, attempt to promote and produce
program results through third parties.
13

State and local governments [author's
emphasis] represent nearly 80,000
jurisdictional intermediaries, and state
and local officials (both elected and
appointed) constitute over 10 million
individual intermediaries. Using these
go-betweens, however, compels federal
agencies to pursue administrative
control strategies that emphasize
regulation .Qy such means as attaching
national policy objectives, mandates, or
"strings" to grant programs [emphasis
added].
The third autonomy criteria, administrative
constraints, stresses the degree to which a state is
permitted to address its concerns through legislative and
bureaucratic action.

Are the states permitted to change,

define, delete, or increase the programs, regulations, and
requirements of the federal government?

How much oversight

is there on the part of the federal government?

How heavy

is the hand that controls the purse and the leash?
State and local officials act in an
intergovernmental web in which the
national government is the more visible
partner. They continue to exercise
great influence and discretion over how
they utilize their influence. The
decisions they make - even those garbed
in the language of budgetary adjustment
and bureaucratic reorganization are
intensely political in the sense that
they reflect conflicting interests among
competing groups, and effect [sic] the
distribution of power and resources
among these groups. (Henig, 1985, p. vi)
Although not always addressing the criterion of
autonomy, most works on federalism and IGR refer to some
aspect of the three.

Whether it is concerning financial aid
14

to urban areas, regulatory requirements regarding welfare
programs, or the procedures established by federal agencies
to administer programs, autonomy criterion cannot be avoided.
Generally, most authors seem to assume some measure of
federal assistance and control.

Federal Intrusion

The second concept, federal intrusion, frequently
overlaps autonomy, yet is distinctly different.

Federal

intrusion focuses upon the depth of federal activity into
state operations and programs, rather than the structural
focus of autonomy.

Two criterion reveal the extent of

federal intrusion.

The first is information flow,

categorized as horizontal or vertical.

The nature of the

information is closely tied to direction.

Vertical flow is

usually associated with formal communications and horizontal
with informal communications.

Communications which direct

action are, by definition, formal communications.

Directive

communications requires a superior/subordinate relationship.
Horizontal communications are normally associated with
informal communications, but may include formal
communications which are not directive.
vertical communications.

Federalism requires

Although horizontal communications

may exist, they are optional and not required for Federalism
to operate.

15

The second criteria is the extent to which federal
government assistance and regulations intrude into the
decision-making capacities and operations of the state.

The

criteria assesses the degree to which federal influence
permeates the state organization or program.
Information flow, the first criteria and a component
of IGR, looks at the types of communications and their
movement within the structure of federalism/IGR.

The flow

is generally vertical, or directive, in nature for programs
the federal government controls or provides assistance.
Yet, this direction does not incorporate a multi-dimensional
flow of information.

Direction is essentially uni-

dimensional since the federal government dictates a desired
action.

Multi-dimensional, or informal, flows indicate a

minimum of a two party discussion in which the participants
are not subordinated to each other.

Free and open

communications are pursued, absent of one party's ability to
enforce a desired action upon the others.

The states and

federal government are equals in a multi-dimensional flow.
Wright (1984), and Glendening and Reeves (1984)
describe the movement of information between layers of
government as vertical and horizontal.

They address

horizontal movement as the informal exchange of information
between professionals within a field or expertise.

Informal

IGR communications, unfortunately, seem restricted to
specialized areas (e.g., environmentalists, engineers, and

16

health professionals).

Federal regulatory requirements,

regulations, and audits for example, are vertically
directive by their very nature.

However, not all

inf orrnation exchanged between the states and the central
federal government relates solely to formal IGR
communications.

Frequently, discussions on proposed

regulations and congressional bills flow between state and
federal agencies.
Federalisrn/IGR scholars continue to view states as a
level of government subordinate to the federal center.

Even

scholars attempting to address states as a means of
development of new programs and initiatives, such as Osborne
(1990), often fall into this mind set of federal
predominance.

Henig (1985, p. v) decried the scholarly

focus:
States and localities are not dull or
insignificant, but they have been made
to seem that way. University catalogues
and academic journals show a growing
interest in the broadly defined field of
public policy. All too often, however,
the interesting and controversial policy
issues are interpreted as corning under
the more or less exclusive purview of
the national government. During the
1960s and early 1970s, cities, in
particular, were seen as the
battleground on which existing issues
having to do with race.and class
conflict were being resolved.
Textbooks, today, however, give the
impression that state and local
government involves little more than
balancing revenues against expenditures
[emphasis added].

17

Common to f ederalism/IGR casework are passages
acknowledging the federal government as a contributor, if
not the sole contributor, of assistance (e.g., funds)
necessary to begin or accomplish a major state program.

The

states studied by Osborne (1990) achieved their success
through the contributions of the federal government.
Grants, loans, and other financial instruments, were either
directly provided or backed by the federal government.
Certainly, the federal government's regulations and
requirements were involved if federal funds were used.
is the second criteria of intrusion.

This

It looks at the

extent to which federal financial assistance and regulations
intrude upon the decision-making capacities of a state
program.
The degree of intrusion of the federal government into
the routine operation of state and local governments is
extensive.

The influence of the federal government often

permeates programs at the lowest levels of program
management.

Glendening and Reeves (1984, p. 74) relate in

their book, Pragmatic Federalism; An Intergovernmental View
of American Government:

Because of the greater specialization of
categorical grant programs and their
broader functional spread, as well as
the increasing national tendency to
regulate activities of the state and
local governments, the federal influence
penetrates deeper into state
administration.

18

The federal government provides grants and program aid
often critically necessary for the states to pursue programs
and projects, even new ideas.

Often, this 'assistance' is

accompanied by guidelines on how the support may and may not
be used.

Reports and audits are not uncommon, even for the

most liberal support.

Glendening and Reeves (1984, p. 79)

address this issue:
Regulations attached to grants may
require planning, establish accounting
and auditing standards, prescribe
administrative procedures, or set out
performance standards, among a host of
other things.
Each program has its
unique set of conditions, often referred
to as vertical conditions, with which
state and local governments must comply
to receive federal funds.

THREE FRAMEWORKS

Federalism/IGR theory currently offers two views, or
frameworks, of federal-state relationships.

The first looks

at the state as a bureaucratic layer within a federal
hierarchy.

The state performs as a functionary for the

federal government.

The second framework observes the state

as an ally of the federal government.

The state-federal

relationship is a partnership, although the state remains a
junior partner.

This thesis offers a third framework.

Federalism/IGR theory, as currently documented and
portrayed, fails to address cases in which states pursue
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their own interests separate from any federal entanglement.
specifically, it fails to discuss those programs and
projects states establish and operate without federal funds,
oversight, or direction to perform.

The Constitution of the

United States promotes the authority of the individual
states to address the concerns and welfare of their
citizens.

This authority, outlined in the Tenth Amendment,

often comes into conflict with the Federal Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution's Article Six.

Article Six grants the

federal government preemptive authority over state
constitutions and laws.

Confusion between interpretations

and division of authority are prevalent among scholars,
government officials, and the general public (Wright, 1988
and Glendening and Reeves, 1984).

However, the growth

towards a powerful and centralized government overshadows
the ability of the states to operate independently of the
federal government.
The national government has become the
dominant partner - legally, financially,
and programmatically - under the federal
arrangement; nevertheless, states still
retain important political powers and
governmental functions that make them a
necessary part of the partnership.
(Glendening and Reeves, 1984, p. 63)
Today, the average citizen looks toward the massive and
complex federal power to address his or her individual
needs.

This often means the unacknowledged rejection of a

level of government, by the general public and scholars
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alike, that is frequently the better choice to address
problems and concerns, the state.

The State as a Bureaucratic Layer

The current literature on federalism and !GR portrays
states essentially within two frameworks.

The first

framework views the state as a bureaucratic layer.

Here,

the state is a formal part of the bureaucratic chain
reaching from the individual citizen to the three branches
of the federal government, and back to the citizen.
state is seen as an 'arm' of the federal government.

The
Many

of the programs usually associated with the state or local
governments are, in reality, extensions of federal
government activities (Anton, 1989).

The state and local

governments are acting as federal government proxies.
State governments operating as bureaucratic extensions
of the federal government are strictly bound to perform in
prescribed ways with little or no discretion.

The federal

government's concern is that the "national legislative and
executive will is not thwarted" by the state and local
governments administering federal programs (Goggin et al,
1990, p. 76). 4

Federal program administrators use a variety

of instruments to advance their aims and enforce compliance
by the lower levels of government, such as partial and full
preemption, "appropriations, moral suasion, technical
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assistance, loans, standard operating procedures,
regulations, and penalties" (Goggin, et al, 1990, p. 76).
Within the bureaucratic framework, a state is provided
the funds and program to operate, but permitted little
autonomy.

Often, the amount of funds offered to the states

is less than the program requires to operate.

This

viewpoint is frequently expressed in writings on regulatory
federalism.

The federal government gains at the expense of

the states under this framework and relationship.
Glendening and Reeves (1984, p. 83) provide a clear picture
of this approach:
Prescription and compulsion have
replaced the negotiation that previously
was the prevailing norm in nationalstate relations. Furthermore, the use
of states as enforcers of national rules
and goals is a cheap way of evidencing
Congressional support for certain
problems ... In addition, the use of
states as enforcers of national policies
is an inexpensive way for the national
government to regulate in terms of both
finances and political costs. State,
rather than federal, employees are used
to administer the regulations, thus
avoiding the political and financial
costs of a larger bureaucracy and
leaving the states with the onus of
being the regulator.

Until 1965, regulatory compliance was encouraged by
federal agencies through the use of additional funds as
enticements and/or by the threat of discontinued federal aid
for a particular program (Glendening and Reeves, 1984).
Congress changed tactics starting with the Highway
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Beautification Act of 1965 by withholding funds allocated to
other grant programs.

As a result, other federal programs

of assistance included the same type of provision.

"For

instance, the Energy Conservation Act of 1974, in an attempt
to cut fuel consumption, prohibited the Secretary of
Transportation from approving any [authors' emphasis]
highway construction of projects in states with speed limits
in excess of 55 miles per hour" (Glendening and Reeves,
1984, p. 80).

The Health Planning and Resources Act was the

apex of this movement.

It forces states to participate in

health planning or face the loss of federal funds for not
only the act itself, but 41 other health assistance programs
as well (Glendening and Reeves, 1984).
States may not have the choice of whether or not to
participate.

Even if they were to decide to risk the loss

of federal funds, some federal programs can not be avoided
(e.g., Civil Rights).
coopt the states.

The federal government may simply

This is a change from the previous

historical cooperative relationship between the states and
the federal government.

The State as a Federal Ally

The state as an ally to the federal government is the
second common framework of federalism/IGR.

The state is

provided broad guidelines and considerable room for
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interpretation.

Assistance is also provided, but the

federal government oversight is usually relaxed.

The

alliance between the states and the federal government,
however, is built upon a firm knowledge of federal
preeminence.

Anton (1989) argues that local officials fully

understand the ability of the federal government to direct
action and to control their behavior.

Although federal

courts may intervene to define limits to the federal
government's "coercive authority," there remains the
knowledge of the "legally coercive reality" of the federal
government's power (Anton, 1989, p. 210).
Most block grants, aid programs, and revenue sharing
programs fall within the second framework.
independent of the federal government.

The state is not

The elaborate system

of grants-in-aid is used by the federal government to induce
the state and local governments to accomplish the desires of
Washington (Berkley, 1984).

The corresponding

administrative and regulatory requirements establish limits
to state and local government actions.
Although states are portrayed as partners to the
federal government, they remain junior partners in the
relationship.

The federal government still dictates how

funds are obtained, how they will be used, what the
restrictions and requirements are, and what administrative
controls must exist.

The states are free to pursue their

own agendas provided the federal agenda is fulfilled.
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California is free to pursue its environmental activist
programs provided the federal Environmental Protection
Agency requirements are met first.

The State as an Autonomous Entity

I offer a third framework, the state as an autonomous
entity.

The state, in this descriptive model, pursues its

own interests separately from the federal government.
Federal funds are not used, federal regulations do not
require state action, and the federal government does not
possess oversight authority.

The state elects to establish,

fund, operate, and oversee programs and projects without
federal interference.

Such state operations do exist (e.g.,

Illinois' Division of Safety Inspection and Education).
Unfortunately, scholars and citizens alike no longer
see the state as a functioning and autonomous level of
government.

They believe the federal government has become

the preeminent power and the states and local governments
are now only functionaries of Washington.

Henig (1985, p.

2) discusses this perception:
Some citizens and some scholars have
concluded that the national government
has effectively elbowed the states and
localities aside - leaving them to
occupy themselves with carrying out
federal policies and allowing them power
only in the sphere of the trivial and
mundane. This perceived nationalization
of significant decision-making functions
has contributed to a tendency to
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underplay the distinct role of states
and localities in formulating policies
that determine the quality of our lives.
(Henig, 1985, p. 2)
Logically, independent state operations will exist
primarily within the public sector. 5

A state's public

sector is less open to interference from the federal
government.

A state's public sector is closely associated

with the functions and authority of the state.

The federal

government is reluctant about interfering with the public
sectors of states, largely due to the ambiguous
constitutional division of powers between states and the
federal government.

According to Henig (1985), state and

local governments continue to exercise considerable power
directly in areas normally associated with the public
sector.

These include the delivery of services, regulation

of businesses and professions, economic development,
physical infrastructure, and law enforcement (Henig, 1985).

STATES AS INDEPENDENT ACTORS

The US Constitution does not permit interference with a
state's government except under certain conditions.
Although Article Six establishes federal supremacy, the
Tenth Amendment reserves any and all powers not clearly
assigned to the federal government to the states (Houseman,
1986).

The conflict between federal supremacy and states
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rights remains an issue.

Supreme Court decisions provide a

clear division between state and federal authority, but are
sometimes reversed and changed, which creates confusion. 6
Congress attempts to circumvent the confusion and the
potential limitations upon its powers.

Broad

interpretations of various parts of the Constitution (e.g.,
Commerce Clause) are used by Congress to legitimize
legislation otherwise violating the Tenth Amendment.

For

example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 uses
two constitutional references, the Commerce Clause and the
mandate to provide for the general well-being of the public
(Public Law 91-596, 1970).

The broad interpretations of

Congress and the Supreme Court, intentional or not, weaken
the autonomy of the states.
Unfortunately, rather than supporting state autonomy,
many scholars and citizens see a powerful central government
as a necessity and look to this government for remedies to
all of society's ills.

The normative and common belief that

states are not important and the federal government is all
powerful is not correct.
in all circumstances.

Nor is it a necessity or desirable

States have and do play a major role

in the lives of American citizens - not as functionaries of
the federal government, but as autonomous governments with
capacities and resources of their own.
operate multi-dimensionally.

Today, states

States may be a bureaucratic

level for some federal programs and a ally of the federal
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government in others.

Yet, states are much more.

operate independently and alone.

They also

It is this which is

frequently ignored or overshadowed.
States as independent and autonomous actors is not new.
States pursued their own interests well before the federal
government gained ascendancy.

Welfare programs,

environmental protection projects, transportation
enhancements, labor rights, and other issues were often
addressed by the states well before the federal government
became involved.
The welfare system of today is an excellent example.
The current program is considered a product of the federal
government.

The federal program grew from the National

Security Act of 1935 legislated during the Great Depression

of the 1930s.

From this foundation act developed many of

the welfare programs of today.

However, welfare was not a

national program prior to the Great Depression of the 1930s.
According to Henig (1985, p. 97):

Throughout early American history,
welfare was marked by local efforts.
Friends and neighbors provided aid to
widows and orphans - the "worthy poor."
During the nineteenth century, the
states became gradually more active.
It
was not until the 1930s, in the
aftermath of the Great Depression, that
the national government moved onto
center stage.
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States were, and are, involved in areas other than
welfare.

The industrial states enacted and enforced safety

and health laws well before the federal government
established programs in these areas.

The state of Illinois,

for example, enacted legislation in 1936 (Health and Safety
Act, Public Law 1935-36, Third Sp. Sess.) establishing
minimum safety and health standards for industrial
operations; 34 years before the passage of the federal
government's Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act of
1970 (Illinois Public Act 87-245, 1982).

Other states

pursued environmental concerns (e.g., California) before
such issues became a political necessity in Washington DC.
In other cases, states established programs and operations
to sell the products of their industries outside the
boundaries of the United States and to attract foreign
investments (e.g., Illinois, Michigan, and Kentucky).

One,

Illinois, opened 'trading centers' in foreign countries to
promote economic development at home.
Osborne's (1990) portrayal of the state as a laboratory
is a useful concept.

Its use is not in looking at federally

supported state programs, but in the autonomous actions of
the states addressing the concerns and needs of their
constituencies.

Osborne applied his concept to programs

receiving federal assistance, thereby reducing the
effectiveness of the model's application.

The laboratory

concept is clearest when focused upon autonomous state
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programs developed, operated, and maintained from strictly
state resources - not federal.

States did develop programs

and guidelines for many areas of concern that are now the
focus of the federal government.

Yet many of these state

programs were developed and accomplished without federal
assistance, appropriations, or oversight.

Gittell (1986)

recognizes the importance of states as the source of many of
the federal government's programs of today.

She states "it

would be difficult, in fact, to point to any national
program that is not an outgrowth of some earlier local or
state initiative" (Gittell, 1986, p. 2).

Social policies,

such as unemployment legislation, child labor laws, OSH
acts, and disability support for blue collar workers can be
traced to the northeastern and mid-Atlantic states.

The

western states' more recent stringent regulatory programs on
pollution are causing industries look to Washington for less
restrictive national legislation (Gittell, 1986).
The third framework, the state as an autonomous entity,
is alive and still effective.

This contradicts the

prevalent portrayals of the state as a bureaucratic layer
and the state as a federal ally.

States remain capable of

performing as independent entities.

Not only are they

capable, but they will proceed separately from the federal
government when it is perceived in their best interests.
The IGR/Federalist theory is not complete.
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis deals with the state as an autonomous
entity.

Through a case study, the thesis focuses upon how

one state operates within the proposed third framework.

I

selected the state of Illinois's Division of Safety
Inspection and Education (DSIE), a subordinate unit of the
state's Department of Labor, to illustrate the third
framework.

The division operates solely within the public

sector, does not receive any financial support from the
federal government, and the program it administers is not
required by federal statutes.
I look at the development of OSH within the state of
Illinois prior to the OSH Act of 1970, the state's decision
to disassociate itself from the federal program in 1974, the
state legislature's decision to establish DSIE, and the
growth of the state agency.
This foundation assists in developing the contextual
situation used to analyze the state's operation.

The

autonomous nature of the state of Illinois' OSH program from
federal control and direction establishes the viability and
applicability of the third framework:
autonomous entity.
1.

I consider the following questions:

Why did Illinois pursue an OSH program separate

from OSHA?
program.

the state as an

Illinois chose to be independent of the federal
The state's history shows an active OSH concern.
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The interests of the state and federal government appear to
coincide.
2.

Is the Illinois operation truly an autonomous

program, separate from OSHA?

If DSIE is responsible to OSHA

in any manner, whether financially or through federal
administrative and regulatory oversight, then the Illinois
OSH operation does not support the proposed third framework.
3.

What type of IGR communications are exchanged

between the state and federal programs?
Federal intrusion is the concern.

State and local?

A primarily vertical flow

identifies the presence of a formal relationship between two
organizations.

If the primary flow of communications is

horizontal, the indication is one of professional exchange
of information.
The study indicates the deficiencies of the current
IGR/Federalist discussion.

The study illustrates how the

current theory fails to account for the independent actions
of states in which the federal government does not play a
financial, regulatory, and oversight role(s).

I also show

how the inclusion of the third framework, the state as an
autonomous entity, enhances IGR and offers a third view of
federalism.
The use of the case study approach is often criticized
for its lack of empirical comparisons.

Scholars, such as

Mccurdy and Cleary (1984), White (1986), and Cleary (1992),
dismiss the case study approach as unscientific.
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They

stress a more practitioner type approach based upon
quantifiable data (Cleary, 1992).
There are, however, proponents of the case study
approach.

Bailey "argues that properly

structured case studies will live up to the scientific
standards of rigor, including generalizability,
transferability, and replicatability" (1992, p. 47).

She

states researchers are being pressured to use "positivist
social science methodologies thought to be associated with
'mature disciplines'" instead of case studies (Bailey, 1992,
p. 48).

Bailey points out that case studies are a key

methodology used by the hard sciences, such as the work of
physics and chemistry (Bailey, 1992).

She concludes her

argument with (Bailey, 1992, p. 53):
One of the basic problems in the
discipline [public administration],
which may partly explain why case
studies are generally regarded as weak
scientifically, is that social science
programs do not generally stress the
development of analytical or critical
thinking skills. In the natural
sciences, analytical skills are
developed along with substantive
knowledge through laboratory courses
that are linked with classroom
lectures ... Scholars in public
administration and the positivist social
sciences need to understand that the
case study methods does not necessarily
equate with lack of theory development,
and that theoretical research does not
equate with usefulness. If advancement
of the field is the goal, then all are
equally important.
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Box (1992) also challenges the recent emphasis upon the
standards and techniques of one type of empirical research.
He believes this "dramatically narrows the ways in which
knowledge may be acquired, understood, and communicated"
(Box, 1992, p. 69).

He contends this is a value judgment

which forces a specific view of knowledge and disregards all
others (Box, 1992).
A properly constructed case study is a legitimate means
of conducting scientific research.

The case study itself is

an analytical view of the relationship of reality to theory
(Box, 1992).

An analytical case study looks at common

characteristics and relationships in a given situation or
program.

Its use is to determine if a theory is valid,

reliable, and consistent with the case under study.
Although the focus is upon the analytical process, certainly
such a study may provide the basis for further empirical
research.
This thesis is not a work of comparison between similar
governmental agencies.

Nor is it a work defining the degree

to which one unit is more autonomous than another.

Rather,

it is a conceptual exercise directed towards explaining a
deficiency in the current federalism/IGR theorem and
offering an additional framework of explanation and study.
It is not my intention to disprove federalism/IGR, but
to document the enlargement of the theory.

This goal

required the selection and in depth review of a case which
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the theory, as currently discussed, fails to explain.

This

same case must also demonstrate the validity of my proposal.
The criterion for the case study selection was based
upon the requirements expressed by the proposed addendum to
the theory.

First, the operation had to be authorized and

administered at the state level.

Second, the agency

responsible for the operation or program must be solely
funded through state revenues.

No financial assistance in

the form of federal grants or loans could be within the
budget of the state agency.

Third, the agency had to

operate without federal oversight or control.

In summary,

the entire operation had to be strictly a state operation
without the formal involvement of the federal government.
It would be difficult to say the federal government
does not have any impact upon a state operation.

Stretched

sufficiently, any writer can make a case of federal
intrusion from purely informal linkages.

This only confuses

the issue and exaggerates the ability of the federal
government to control state and local governments.
Therefore, my thesis is restricted to the absence of overt
control and management elements such as financial, regulatory,
and administrative constraints.

Informal connections

between state and federal agencies are acceptable provided
they do not impinge upon the autonomous nature of the state
operation.

However, the existence of such informal channels

are discussed.
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I selected the Illinois Department of Labor's Division
of Safety Inspection and Education (DSIE) for the following
reasons:
1)

The operation meets the requirements of the

proposed framework.
2)

Research into the operation is unbiased by the

presence of other studies and published material.

The

division has not been the subject of any previous serious
scholarly study to my knowledge and the knowledge of the
division's staff.
3)

The age of the agency was another important factor.

I did not want a new agency with less than five years of
operation since sufficient information for the study may not
be available.
My selection of government officials, both federal and
state, to interview required each prospect meet certain
criterion.

Although these individuals are not the directors

of the agencies I researched, they are knowledgeable and
were willing to be interviewed.

However, they were

reluctant to be directly quoted for various reasons.

The

criterion I applied to the selection of interviewees was:
1)

A member of the federal or state agencies directly

involved in the research.

The interviewees had to hold a

position directly related to the research topic and case.
For example:

OSHA's Directorate of Federal/State Operations

in Washington, D.C.
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2)

Fully knowledgeable of their agency's policies,

programs, and procedures as related to the research topic
and case.

Corporate knowledge was also important which

required individuals with several years employment with the
specific agency.
3)

Willing to participate in an interview conducted in

person or by telephone.

Personal interviewing was not

possible with the majority of the prospects.
The techniques for elite interviewing espoused by
Mannheim and Rich (1981) were followed to prepare and
conduct the interviews.

Appointments were made in advance

with each individual, detailed explanations of the
interview's purpose were avoided to prevent biasing, points
of contact for verification of authenticity and purpose were
provided, and follow-up contacts were made to ensure the
interviews remained on schedule or were rescheduled as
necessary.

Since the majority of the interviews were

performed over the telephone, special care was taken to
ensure respondent concerns were met without jeopardizing the
interview or research.

The one in-person interview,

although Mannheim and Rich (1981) do not recommend
interviews with more than one interviewee at a time, was a
joint session with two members of the state agency staff.
However, the joint interview was necessitated by the
constraints facing both the interviewer and interviewees.
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An extensive questionnaire (Appendix 2) was prepared
for the interviews.

The interviews were informal and

permitted the respondent to respond to the depth each felt
appropriate.

Not all the questions were asked of each

respondent.

Specific questions were extracted from the

questionnaire for specific interviews.

This was necessary

to align the interviews to the agencies and positions of the
queried individuals.

Often, the answer to one question

precluded the necessity of asking other questions of the
same interviewee.

This frequently occurred due to the

breath and depth of the responses provided by the
interviewee to questions asked earlier in the interview.

At

the end of each interview, the respondent was encouraged to
provide any additional information or insight they felt
might be beneficial to my understanding of the topic and
case.
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Chapter 2
OSHA AND THE STATE OF ILLINOIS:
THE RETURN TO THE THIRD FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION

The passage of the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH)
Act of 1970 offered American workers the prospect of a
unified program dedicated to their health and well-being.
Congress, the Executive Branch, and the public supported the
idea.

Occupational safety and health (OSH), however, was

not a new concept.

Prior to the enactment of the federal

program, OSH regulatory guidelines and enforcement already
existed.

Some dated from the 19th Century, others were

established during the early 20th Century.

Enacted and

managed by state legislatures, state OSH programs addressed
the major concerns of the state populace and industry.
State OSH programs generally focused upon the types of
industry located within their boundaries.

For example:

West Virginia emphasized coal mining and Pennsylvania's
program included steel production.

Various constituencies

(e.g., labor, business, and child welfare interest groups)
pressed state legislatures to enact laws concerning child
labor, industrial workplace safety requirements, and other
similar safety and health issues.

The increasing strength

of organized labor during the late 1930s through the early
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1950s was reflected in the growth of state OSH regulatory
efforts up to the passage of the federal OSH Act of 1970
(Curington, 1988).
State programs were different from state to state.
State OSH efforts ran the gamut from negligible or low
levels of state regulatory oversight to the fairly complex.
Table 2-1 rank orders state programs based upon the number
of state OSH codes and regulations in existence on the date
of the passage of the OSH Act of 1970. 7

The number of state

OSH codes and regulations provide us with a fairly general
idea of the diversity of state enforcement efforts before
the enactment of the federal program.
States developed, enforced, funded, and administered
their programs separately from one another and the federal
government.

In the 1960's, there emerged a growing

awareness of the differences between state programs.
Although national industry standards (e.g., National
Electrical Code and National Fire Code) developed by the
private sector were often incorporated as the mainstay of
state programs, differences of interpretation and
application did exist (Curington, 1988).

Additionally,

organized labor became increasingly concerned with areas of
safety and health either not addressed or adequately covered
by state programs.

The diversity of programs between states

was seen as a serious problem, especially since

40

Table 2-1
Number of Industrial Safety Codes

State

Total

California
Oregon
w. Virginia
Washington
Alaska
Kentucky
Indiana
Alabama
Maryland
Oklahoma
New York
Arkansas
Washington D.C.
New Jersey
Tennessee
Illinois
Florida
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Hawaii
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Wisconsin
Idaho
North Carolina

99
98
95
93
91
91
90
89
89
89
87
86
82
78
74
74
73
72
72
71
69
67
67
65
64

Median

62

SOURCE:

NOTE:

State
Colorado
Delaware
Georgia
Nevada
Michigan
Montana
Rhode Island
Wyoming
New Mexico
Virginia
Nebraska
Vermont
Arizona
Maine
North Dakota
Iowa
Connecticut
Utah
Louisiana
New Hampshire
Kansas
South Dakota
Mississippi
Missouri
Texas
South Carolina

Total
62
62
61
59
59
58
56
54
54
48
48
47
46
45
40
39
37
36
33
30
27
25
19
19
16
2

Extracted from William P.Curington's article,
Federal Versus State Regulation: The Early Years
of OSHA, in Social Science Quarterly, pages 342343.
"Health regulations and licensing qualifications for
various occupations are excluded from the total
number of regulations" (Curington, 1988, p. 343).
School eye protection laws are also excluded
(Curington, 1988).
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standardization between programs did not exist.

Organized

labor believed a centralized and standardized program,
operated by the federal government, was the cure to the
problem (McGovern, 1987).

OSHA

Development

The 91st Congress (Second Session) passed Public Law
91-596 in December 1970.

The law, entitled the Occupational

Safety and Health Act of 1970, established the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) under the
administration of the U.S. Department of Labor (McGovern,
1987).

The act was designed in response to a growing

national concern, largely expressed by labor unions and
similar special interests, regarding the safety and wellbeing of working men and women in the American workplace.
Later designated 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. 553, 651-678, the
Act was Congress's attempt to meet these needs.
The Department of Labor and Congress were the
recipients of heavy union lobby efforts.

The Department of

Labor was considered by many at the time to be sympathetic
toward organized labor and the need for a national OSH
policy.

The issue of national safety and health standards
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became politicized (Curington, 1988 and Calavita, 1988).
The bureaucrats of the U.S. Department of Labor and the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, as well as
members of Congress, saw a federal OSH organization and
program in an extremely favorable light (Mallino and Werner,
1973).

Who could reasonably dispute the issue?

Differences arose between the two federal departments
over the placement of the proposed OSH program.

The

Department of Labor (DOL) and the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW), and their supporters, argued
among themselves and in Congress to gain control of the
federal OSH program.

The fight was not to establish and

operate a national OSH program; rather it was which
department of the Executive Branch would be the program's
home.

A legislative compromise provided each of the

departments with defined jurisdiction and oversight (Public
Law 91-596, 1970; McGovern, 1987; and Curington, 1988).
The Congress also moved to gain state support and
involvement.

The new law contains offers of grants and

financial aid to those states willing to join the federal
program.

Congress eliminated the potential threat of active

opposition by those states not willing to join the federal
program.

Either each state actively participates as a

member of the federal program or OSHA assumes jurisdiction
over the state's private sector economy (Public Law 91-596,
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1970).

Congress used the Commerce Cause of the U.S.

Constitution as its authority for this action.
Two specific Constitutional references were used,
commerce and the public's general well-being.

Section 2,

paragraph b of the act (Public Law 91-596, 1970) states:
The Congress declares it to be its
purpose and policy, through the exercise
of its powers to regulate commerce among
the several States and with foreign
nations and to provide for the general
welfare, to assure so far as possible
every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working
conditions and to preserve our human
resources.
The Act grants wide ranging powers to the federal
government and encourages the active participation of state
polities.

The Congress proclaims the purpose of the act is:
To assure safe and healthful working
conditions for working men and women; by
authorizing enforcement of the standards
developed under the Act; by assisting
and encouraging the States in their
efforts to assure safe and healthful
working conditions; by providing for
research, information, education, and
training in the field of occupational
safety and health; and for other
purposes.
(Public Law 91-596, 1970)

In effect, Congress created an agency and program to
regulate the workplaces of America.

The agency was granted

legal authority to develop standards, inspect for adherence
to these standards, and enforce the use of those standards
through fine assessment and the judicial system.

The two

constitutional ties (commerce and the public's general well
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being) prevented the Congress, however, from directly
including state and local government employees.

Growing Opposition

During the first few months of OSHA's operation,
approximately 4400 job safety and health standards were
adopted from existing federal directives, industry codes,
and consensus groups (McGovern, 1987).

This number

continued to grow and prompted complaints the standards were
excessive and counterproductive.

Critics charged the

standards were often trivial, inflexible, and difficult to
understand.

Penalties, they stated, were often unreasonable

for first offenses.

The costs for compliance would also

drive small businesses into closure (McGovern, 1987).

These

complaints came from the supporters of business.
Labor complained OSHA did not perform enough
enforcement, and when it did, the enforcement was weak and
sporadic.

According to McGovern (1987), organized labor

leaders frequently criticized the federal agency for acting
too slowly to correct the thousands of potential OSH
hazards.
Most of the complaints from both sides centered on
OSHA's inspection efforts (McGovern, 1987).

Business

complained about any perceived problem such as overbearing
inspectors or harsh reports.
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Labor complained management

was not held strictly to task.

Labor, for example, would

complain of weak or sporadic inspections (McGovern, 1987;
Calavita, 1988; Rees, 1988; and Knudsen, 1988).

Simply

stated, business did not want OSHA around and felt OSHA was
too tough; while labor felt OSHA was not tough enough.
was caught in the middle, as was Congress.

OSHA

Mallino and

Werner (1973, p. ii) observe:
Most congressmen had felt secure in
voting for the Act (who could be against
safety and health?), and they were
astonished at the rapid proliferation of
political problems. Their labor
constituents were, in the words of
George Meany, "screaming bloody murder"
and their business friends were equally
vocal. On the one hand labor was
arguing "too slow ... not enough" and on
the other hand business was insisting
"too fast ... too much."

OSHA Standards

Section 6 of the Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor
to designate any national consensus standard or federal
standard as an OSHA standard.

The Act requires such OSHA

standards as improve the health or safety for specifically
designated employees.

A national consensus standard is

defined in the Act as:
... any occupational safety and
health standard ... adopted and
promulgated by a nationally recognized
standards-producing organization under
procedures ... that persons interested and
affected by ... the standard have reached
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substantial agreement on its
adoption, ... [and] was formulated in a
manner which afforded an opportunity for
diverse views to be considered
and ... designated as ... a standard by the
Secretary, after consultation with other
appropriate Federal agencies.
(Public
Law 596, 1970)
The Act also states a federal standard is any existing
standard used by a federal agency or enacted by Congress
(Public Law 91-596, 1970).

Examples of consensus standards

are those of the American National Standards Institute Inc.
and the National Fire Protection Association.
are broken into four major categories:

The standards

general industry,

maritime, construction, and agriculture (McGovern, 1987; and
Public Law 91-596, 1970).

State Participation

Congress encouraged the participation of the states "to
assume the fullest responsibility for the administration and
enforcement of their occupational safety and health laws"
(Public Law 91-596, 1970).

Grants were offered for a period

of up to two years to assist the states to identify "their
needs and responsibilities in the area of occupational
safety and health, to develop plans in accordance with the
provisions of this Act, to improve the administration and
enforcement of state occupational safety and health laws,
and to conduct experimental and demonstration projects in
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connection therewith" (Public Law 91-596, 1970).

The Act

stated nothing in the legislation would prevent a state
agency or court from exercising its authority under state
law over occupational safety and health provided an OSHA
standard was not in effect.
Under Section 18 of the Act, a state could assume
responsibility for the development and enforcement of
occupational safety and health standards for any related
issues within the state.

The state submits a plan to the

Secretary of Labor for review prior to implementing the
state program.

The state's proposed standards had to equal

or exceed federal standards.

If the Secretary of Labor

approves the plan, follow-up reports are required from the
involved state.

OSHA also performs inspections to ensure

the state is within the plan.

The Act set a deadline of two

years, at which time the states would cease enforcing any
private sector standards they had on the books.

States were

therefore able to legally continue their programs until the
end of fiscal year 1973 (Public Law 91-596, 1970).
Section 23, paragraphs f and g, provided for the
reimbursement of states to a maximum of fifty percent of
their costs for the administration and enforcement of OSH
state plans approved by the Secretary of Labor.

The Act

also authorized the Secretary of Labor to assign grants of
up to fifty percent of a state's total costs to:
... promote, encourage, or ... engage in
programs of studies, information and
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communication concerning occupational
safety and health statistics; ... assist
them in developing and administering
programs dealing with occupational
safety and health statistics; and ... for
the conduct of such research and
investigations as give promise of
furthering the objectives of this
section. (Public Law 91-596, 1970)
The federal government, however, was unable to press
the issue into the state's public sector.

The OSH Act of

1970 expressly forbids federal preemption of state authority
within the public sectors of states not participants in the
federal program.

The OSH Act of 1970 did grant the federal

government control over the public sectors of program
participant states.

OSHA Plan States are required to adhere

to OSHA requirements in both their private and public
sectors to gain federal financial support (Public Law 91596, 1970).

OSHA is authorized to reimburse OSHA Plan

States up to fifty percent of their OSH program
expenditures.

The financial support requirement enables the

federal government to apply and enforce OSHA regulations and
standards within the OSHA Plan States' public sectors.
Fifty-six separate jurisdictions (other than the
federal government itself) were potential OSHA Plan States
(Public Law 91-596, 1970).

The Occupational Safety and

Health Act of 1970 defines state as "a State of the United
States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands" (Public Law 91-596, 1970, Section
49

3(7)).

Currently, twenty-five states, territories,

districts, and protectorates participate as OSHA Plan
States.

Two of these operate only within the public sector

and receive federal financial assistance (OSHA, 1991).
These states once operated the federal program within both
sectors; private and public.

Table 2-2 identifies the

status of each of the fifty-six potential OSHA Plan States.
That only twenty-five states are OSHA Plan States
indicates a strong reluctance on the part of potential
participants to enroll in the federal program.

Many

explanations may exist for the position each state takes.
Reasons for states to remove themselves from a program also
vary from state to state (Table 2-3).

The fact that less

than fifty per cent of the potential candidates accepted the
federal offer is interesting.
The low level of state acceptance, coupled with the
passage of twenty-two years since enactment of the OSH Act
of 1970 and the diminished power of OSHA, offers a unique
portrayal of states operating to their own advantage
separate from the federal government.

The result is

de facto resistance to federal intervention.
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Table 2-2
STATUS OF OSHA STATE PLAN PROGRAM

STATE 2

INITIAL
APPROVAL

Alaska
Arkansas
Alabama
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York
Pennsylvania
Delaware
Maryland
West Virginia
Ohio
Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Mississippi
Tennessee
Kentucky
Indiana
Michigan
Illinois
Wisconsin
Iowa
Missouri
Louisiana
Texas
Minnesota
Oklahoma
Kansas
Nebraska
South Dakota
North Dakota
Montana
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona

FINAL
APPROVAL
x

xa
xa,b
xb
xb
xb
xb
xb

xb
xb
xb
xb
xb

xb

xb
xb
xb
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Table 2-2 (Continued)
STATUS OF OSHA STATE PLAN PROGRAM (Con't)

INITIAL
APPROVAL

STATE 2

xb

Utah
Idaho
Washington
Oregon
Nevada
California
Hawaii

xb
xb
xb
xb
xb

Puerto Rico
U.S. Virgin Islands
Washington D.C.c
American Samoac
Guamc
Trust Territories of
the Pacific Islandsc

NOTES:

SOURCE:

FINAL
APPROVAL

xb

astate Plans for State and Local
Government Employees Only
bstate Plans Certified by OSHA
cstatus Not Identified by OSHA
Extracted from Status of State Occupational
and Health Plans handout of the OSHA Office
of State Plans (1991).
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Table 2-3
OSHA State Plan Withdrawal by States
after Plan Approval by OSHA

Reason a

State
Colorado

State legislature failed to provide
funds for continued plan operation.

Connecticut

Legislature amended its OSH Act by
repealing the private sector portion of
the State Plan.

Illinois

State voluntarily withdrew its plan
during its developmentalbstage due to
political circumstances.

Montana

Enabling legislation rejected; State
funding withdrawn.

New Jersey

Enabling legislation rejected; State
funds withdrawn.

New York

No enabling legislation.

North Dakota

Enabling legislation rejected; State
funding withdrawn.

Wisconsin

No enabling legislation; State funding
withdrawn.

Notes:

aOSHA has never withdrawn a State's plan. The
above mentioned States voluntarily withdrew their
plans.
billinois:

Source:

Date of Submission of Plan for Approval:
January 2, 1973.
Date of Initial Approval: October
28, 1973.
Date Plan Withdrawn (After
Approval): June 30, 1975.

OSHA Office of State Programs, unpublished
information sheet, 1991.
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ILLINOIS AND OSH

The passage of the OSH Act of 1970 was the beginning of
the end of Illinois OSH autonomy within its private sector.
The process took ten years before federal preeminence was
fully established.

State autonomy within the public sector,

however, remained outside the jurisdiction and control of
the federal government.

Although not legally required by

the federal government to pursue OSH within the state's
public sector, Illinois acknowledged its responsibility.
The culmination of this acknowledgement is the establishment
and empowerment of the Illinois Department of Labor's (IDOL)
Division of Safety Inspection and Education (DSIE).
Illinois is a state with a divergent private and public
sector base.

Heavy and light manufacturing, maritime,

agricultural, chemical, mining, transportation,
construction, financial, medical, and many other types of
industries are indigenous to the state.

Few industries are

new to the state and many existed in various forms well into
the 19th Century.

The public sector is equally diverse with

a variety of forms and levels of government.

Included are

commissions, departments, agencies, special districts,
committees, counties, townships, villages, various forms of
municipal government arrangements, boards, and others.
Illinois is one of thirty-one states not participating
in the national program.

Operating solely within the public
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sector, Illinois provides OSH education, inspection, and
enforcement separate from the federal government.

All

levels and aspects of state and local government operations
are subject to the purview of DSIE which is strictly a state
agency.

State municipal, county, special district, parks,

and all other facets of the various units of Illinois
government are serviced by DSIE.

The jurisdictions of DSIE

and OSHA are clearly defined by the division between the
public and private sectors.

The Illinois operation is a

prime example of the third framework, states as autonomous
entities.

1970-1984

The history of the federal program has its parallel in
Illinois.

Prior to the enactment of OSHA, Illinois was

ranked fifteenth in the nation for the number of OSH codes
(See Table 2-1) (Curington, 1988).

Illinois legislators

endeavored to address at least the minimum of the concerns
and needs of Illinois workers.

The state operated as an

autonomous entity within both sectors of its economy.
Federal interference was either very restricted (e.g.,
related to single issues) or absent.
When the federal act was legislated, Illinois passed
enabling legislation (a revision of Public Law 1935-36,
Third Sp. Sess., approved March 16, 1936, entitled Health
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and Safety Act and began the process to become an OSHA

approved State Plan State (Arlene Perkins, 10 April 1991 and
4 February 1992; Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991,
10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Illinois Public Act
87-245, 1982).
The Illinois Industrial Commission (!IC) was empowered
to act as the focal organization within the state.

The IIC,

an organization under the state governor's office and
largely comprised of political appointees, prepared the
state's proposal to become an OSHA Plan State.

Under the

plan, the state was to assume the full responsibilities of
OSHA within the state of Illinois, both for the public and
private sectors.

The state's plan mirrored the federal

program in almost all aspects.

Preliminary approval was

granted by OSHA pending final approval by the Secretary of
Labor (OSHA OAS Ltr w/Atchs, 1975; Gary Smith, 20 February
1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992;
Arlene Perkins, 19 April 1991, and 4 February 1992; Ronald
Besson, 10 April 1991; Kenneth Gilbert, 20 February 1992;
and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).
The aggressive actions of OSHA during the initial years
of the organization drew considerable opposition.

Industry

felt OSHA was generating standards too quickly, there were
too many standards, and enforcement was too strict.

In

fact, industry leaders felt OSHA was going too far and, in
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effect, stifling operations.

Organized labor voiced

concerns OSHA was too lenient and did not do enough.
The conflict was felt within Illinois.

The two extreme

viewpoints created potentially serious political costs to
legislators and public officials.

Both business and labor

interests were sure to press their concerns about OSH.
Business wanted a less constrictive policy, labor wanted
stricter standards and inspections, and the state - not the
federal agency - would be the primary focus of the
conflicting interests.

Compromise seemed unattainable, and

the state found itself in a seemingly no-win situation.
Further, although the fifty percent reimbursement of
operating expenses would come from the OSHA, the state
feared the required state expenditures to operate the
program would exceed previous expenditures.

What appeared

to be a good idea quickly lost favor within the state's
political circles.
The OSH Act of 1970 provided a way out without serious
repercussions to the state.

OSHA is granted power to pursue

its OSH programs within the private sector of those states
not designated OSHA Plan States (Public Law 91-596, 1970).
OSHA, therefore, assumes all OSH regulatory and enforcement
responsibility within such state private sectors.

It meant

the state need not allocate funds, assume any
responsibility, and bear any costs (real or political)
within its private sector.

This offers the state the best
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of two worlds.

The state remains out of the conflict and

the various private sector interests still receive OSH
oversight.

In other words, the state could essentially

avoid the issue, leaving the responsibility and associated
difficulties with the federal government.
sector, however, was not included.

The public

OSHA could not regulate

the public sector of the state under the Act (Public Law 91596, 1970; Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10
April 1991, and 6 February 1992; Robert Nichols and Janet
Wright, 18 February 1992; and Arlene Perkins, 10 April
1991).
In 1974, Illinois took action to drop the proposed
plan.

In June, 1975, the state was officially withdrawn for

political and financial reasons (OSHA OAS Ltr w/Atchs, 1975;
Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991,
and 6 February 1992; Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18
February 1992; and Arlene Perkins, 10 April 1991 and 4
February 1992).

Illinois removed itself from the

controversy then surrounding OSHA.
State legislation was not revised to reflect the
change.

The IIC retained responsibility for OSH regulatory

code enforcement, as well as development.

Illinois OSH

statutes retained their application upon the state's private
sector.
OSHA.

This was in addition to activities on the part of
Unfortunately, the public sector was largely ignored.
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Increasing pressure to enhance OSH within the public
sector was brought to bear by a variety of groups ranging
from concerned citizens to public employee unions.

The

asbestos issue is one subject, albeit one of the more
publicized and widely discussed OSH problems, pursued by
various interest groups within the state.

These interest

groups included maintenance workers, teachers, municipal
officials, and clerical staff.

The state attempted to

resolve such issues under the existing framework of the IIC.
It became evident the IIC was unable to effectively deal
with the increasing demand for OSH guidelines, education,
and inspection.
Simultaneously, the movement toward professional
administrators was gaining strength within Illinois.
Although a civil service structure did exist, many areas
remained under the political system of patronage such as the
IIC (Sherlie Scism, 26 September 1991).

The Department of

Commerce and Community Affairs (DCCA) and economic
development is an example of the 1980s and 1990s.

The

movement is clearly seen in the cases brought before the
Supreme Court against the state and the patronage system.
The case of Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois (Supreme
Court Case 88-1872, decided 21 June 1990) expanded upon
earlier cases (Elrod v. Burns, 1976 and Branti v. Finkel,
1980).

The court stated the Illinois GOP patronage system

violated the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment's right to
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free speech by penalizing government employees and
applicants for their political affiliation (Anonymous,
1990).

These cases complimented a 'grass roots' concern

that areas of complexity involving legal, moral, and ethical
issues required educated, trained, and public service career
committed individuals for effective management and
operation.

Such fundamental issues included OSH (Nichols

and Wright, 1992).
Commercial establishments could be ignored based upon
the case of Simpson v Marietta Corporation (Illinois Public
Act 87-245, 1982).

The Illinois Industrial Commission (!IC)

decided the Illinois Health and Safety Act was preempted by
the federal OSH Act of 1970.
upheld this decision.

The Circuit Court of Peoria

The Illinois Supreme Court, in

Simpson v Industrial Commission (Martin Marietta
Corporation, Appellee) (91 Ill.2d 452, 440 N.E. 2d 94

(1982)), recognized "the fact that the Illinois Industrial
Commission "held that on June 30, 1975, its authority to
enforce the Illinois Health and Safety Act was effectively
preempted by the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act
(29 U.S.C. sec 651 et. seq. (1976)" and that the Circuit
Court confirmed this decision" (Illinois Public Act 87-245,
1982, p. 1, para 137).
The case ended the IIC's private sector involvement.
Already under fire for its political patronage status and
seemingly inept handling of IIC's various responsibilities
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(of which OSH but one), the court's decision brought closer
public and legislative scrutiny.

Establishment of DSIE

These three factors - IIC ineptitude and court
recognized preemption by the federal government, increased
pressure by special interest groups, and the movement
towards professional administrators - all combined to lead
to change.

In 1985, a revision of existing legislation was

introduced to establish a new organization within the
Department of Labor
In October, 1985, the state legislature revised the
Safety Inspections and Education Act through Public Act 86-

1435.

The original act was passed on 18 July 1955 and

underwent several revisions during its history (Gary Smith,
20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991; and Illinois
Public Act 86-1435, 1985).
The 1985 revision provided for the Division of Safety
Inspection and Education (DSIE) under the Illinois
Department of Labor (IDOL).

The revision outlined the

responsibilities of the division.

The legislation empowered

DSIE to perform OSH inspections within the public sector and
to provide OSH education for state workers.

The IIC

remained empowered to promulgate standards and regulations
(Illinois Public Act 87-245, 1982; and Illinois Public Act
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86-1435, 1985).

This last was a compromise to ensure

continued political control of the program; possibly as a
means of responding to business interests.
Illinois Public Act 86-1435 (1985) placed DSIE's staff
positions under IDOL, thereby categorizing the positions
under the state's civil service system.

The effect was to

align the state's OSH program under professional bureaucrats
rather than political appointees.

DSIE OSH personnel

generally join the organization through entry level
positions.

As they obtain training and experience, DSIE

personnel progress within the division's hierarchy (Gary
Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6
February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18
February 1992).
DSIE's first director, Mr. Jerald Pusch, developed the
framework and strategy of the organization.

He deliberately

established DSIE as a state level mirror image of OSHA.
Further, he negotiated an intergovernmental letter of
agreement with !IC delegating to DSIE the authority to
develop and otherwise promulgate OSH related standards and
regulations.

DSIE, however, initially focused upon state

agencies and employees, not the lower levels of government
(IGLOA between IDOL and !IC, 1986; Gary Smith, 6 February
1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February
1992).
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Although the language of the Act discusses commercial
establishments, the intent was to cover only those
operations performed by state employees and state facilities
(Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, and 10 April
1991; Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992; and
Illinois Public Act 86-1435, 1985).

Commercial

establishments are exempt based upon the court decision of
Simpson v Marietta Corporation (Illinois Public Act 87-245,
1982).

The language of the Illinois Safety Inspection and

Education Act, however, did not specify the apparent
limitation to state employees.
Shortly after DSIE was established, the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) filed suit against IDOL on behalf of Illinois
public sector employees.

AFSCME is the largest of the

public sector employee unions within Illinois.

AFSCME

stated the law did not limit OSH coverage to state
employees.

Non-state level government employees were

wrongfully excluded by DSIE.

The Cook County Circuit Court

ruled in January 1987 the law extended to all Illinois
public sector employees under the jurisdiction of the state.
This included all state, county, municipal, school district,
and park employees (Circuit Court of Cook County, General
Chancery Case Number 85CH11947, 1986; Gary Smith, 20
February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February
1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February
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1992).

For the first time, the entire public sector was

covered under a mandated OSH program.

Overnight, DSIE's

scope of operations expanded several fold.
The inclusion of the local governments increased the
need by these polities for OSH training, consultative
review, and inspection.

DSIE conducts seminars and training

sessions free of charge to state and local governments, as
well as employee organizations and other interested groups.
A variety of subjects are available, ranging from office
safety through the more hazardous operations such as
trenching.

DSIE provides handouts and frequently uses

audio-visual presentations obtained from the Region 5 off ice
of OSHA (Ronald Besson, 10 April 1991; Gary Smith, 20
February 1991, 9 April 1991, and 10 April 1991; and Robert
Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).
DSIE spends a significant percentage of its enforcement
activities within the municipalities (the Northern Illinois
Area Manager reports upward of 80 percent for his area).
These built-up areas, especially the larger cities,
generally have the more hazardous operations.

The largest

share of complaints, concurrently, come from the employees
of these large municipalities (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991,
9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; ;and
Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).
Although cross-servicing does exist in cities crossing
state boundaries (e.g., East St. Louis/St. Louis, and
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Moline/Rock Island), DSIE does not claim jurisdiction over
public sector work crews from another state performing tasks
within Illinois.

The state the crew comes from (whether

Indiana, Missouri, or Iowa) retains jurisdiction.

The OSH

requirements for these states are as stringent, or more so,
than those of Illinois (Gary Smith, 20 February 1992, 9
April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert
Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).

OSH Standards

According to Mr. Smith (20 February 1992, 9 April 1991,
10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992) and Mr. Nichols (18
February 1992) every state uses OSHA standards as the basis
for their internal programs.

Federal standards are often

supplemented by those developed internally by the states as
well as those taken from industry.

The state of Illinois,

for example, uses the 1910 General Industry Standards.

The

adoption of OSHA and industry standards precludes the
lengthy and costly development of state standards.
Therefore, the operational standards of each state basically
resemble each other (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April
1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols
and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).
DSIE does not establish or use formal committees to
review proposed public sector OSH standards.
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Reviews are

conducted internally with affected agencies contacted for
their input.

The Illinois State Legislature's Joint Rules

Committee reviews any proposed DSIE standards or revisions
before they are placed into force (Gary Smith, 20 February
1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and
Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).
In 1988 DSIE initiated development of a new standard
under delegated authority authorized by the IIC/IDOL Letter
of Agreement (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10
April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and
Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).

This endeavor, the first

in the history of DSIE, consumed a year of work on the part
of the division and affected agencies (Gary Smith, 20
February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February
1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February
1992).

The proposed standard dealt with fire

department/company equipment, supplies, clothing, and
training.

DSIE attempted to gain the acceptance of local

governments, fire unions, and local fire companies.

The

division contacted ten of the fifteen fire associations
representing constituent groups within the state.

Each of

the ten associations were solicited for ideas and comments
on the DSIE prepared draft (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9
April 1991, and 10 April 1992).

Hearings, discussions, and

conceptual solicitations were held throughout the state to
acquire support and to develop a workable standard (Gary

66

Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6
February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18
February 1992).
Public hearings were held by the IDOL Hearing Section.
The section conducts all IDOL hearings.

Formal comments and

recommended changes from the hearings (four hearings in all)
were addressed individually to ensure each was fairly
assessed.

Prior to the proposed standard reaching the State

Legislature's Joint Rules Committee, however, it was
withdrawn (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10
April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and
Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).
Local governments, particularly the small towns and
rural areas, opposed the draft standard.

The financial

burden associated with the proposed standard often exceeded
the fiscal ability of many local governments.

Even the fire

companies themselves were often less than enthusiastic with
the proposal, perhaps seeing it as an attempt to increase
the amount of red tape or bureaucratic interference within
local operations (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April
1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols
and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).
Pressure was placed on the state's political
leadership, primarily by local government representatives.
This was one aspect of efforts to stop the establishment of
the proposed standard.

The second, and concurrent, attack
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upon the ability of DSIE to promulgate new standards was
taken by the city of Champaign.

Champaign filed suit

against DSIE in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court.
The city of Champaign stated DSIE was not lawfully
empowered to develop new standards, only to enforce them.
The city also alleged the Letter of Agreement between IDOL
and IIC was illegal.

IIC could not delegate its authority

to another agency or organization.
favor of the city of Champaign.

The court decided in

DSIE did not file an

appeal, preferring to resolve the difficulty permanently and
without further judicial entanglements (Circuit Court of the
Sixth Judicial Circuit, Case Number 89-C-62, 1991)
DSIE, through IDOL, requested modification of the
Safety Inspection and Education Act (Gary Smith, 6 February

1992 and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).
Specifically, the proposal empowered DSIE with the ability
to promulgate OSH related standards and regulations.

In

1991, the state legislature passed the revision with the
effective date of 21 January 1992.
The city of Champaign's challenge of DSIE's authority
to develop standards did not affect the division's ability
to enforce existing OSHA standards.

The authority was

already granted within the 1985 legislation.

DSIE is not

required to adopt or enforce OSHA standards.

The division

selects standards believed applicable to the unique
circumstances and needs of the state.

68

The difference

between adopting existing standards and establishing new
standards is not lost upon DSIE leadership and personnel.
DSIE takes the stance they are using existing standards
already in force throughout the country.
DSIE is preparing to regain momentum with the
reintroduction of the standard for fire
departments/companies.

The division does not intend to make

the same mistakes of 1988.

All the affected unions,

agencies, and local governments will have the opportunity to
participate in the process (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9
April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert
Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).

The 1991

legislative empowerment to develop and implement new
standards provides DSIE with greatly enhanced authority and
opportunities.

DSIE Training and Funding

DSIE uses the OSHA Federal Training Institute in
Illinois to train division personnel.

Training is provided

free to all public sector government officials with OSH
responsibilities.

The option is available for local

government employees to attend the OSHA Federal Training
Institute, although local Illinois government officials have
not as yet (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10
April 1991; and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and
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Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).

Private corporations may

also request training allocations for their OSH personnel.
Many corporations avail themselves of this opportunity.
OSHA does not limit training strictly to OSHA Plan State
participants (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10
April 1991, and 6 February 1992; Ronald Besson, 10 April
1991; Kenneth Gilbert, 20 February 1992; and Robert Nichols
and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).
Illinois pays attending DSIE personnel regular wages
and per diem during attendance at the Institute.
not reimbursed by Illinois for training costs.

OSHA is
None of the

attending states are required to reimburse OSHA (Gary Smith,
20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6
February 1992; Kenneth Gilbert, 20 February 1992; and Robert
Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).
DSIE also makes maximum use of OSHA literature and
forms within the Illinois program.

The literature,

educational material, and forms are all provided without
charge to the state.

Local governments are not required to

use the OSHA forms, provided the same information is
contained in the locally developed record documents.

OSHA

materials are generally available, without charge, to any
public agency and the general public (Gary Smith, 20
February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February
1992; Ronald Besson, 10 April 1991; Kenneth Gilbert, 20
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February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18
February 1992).
Technically, OSHA's supplying of training and materials
could be construed as providing financial assistance.
However stretched this argument may appear, it must be
addressed.

Illinois is not the only recipient of this type

of support from OSHA.

Training materials are readily

available and free to any level of government involved in
OSH related activity (e.g., federal, state, county, and
municipal).

None are charged since OSHA is the federal

source for OSH information and the information is offered as
a public service.

Illinois is not required to participate,

respond, or in any way reciprocate for these services (Gary
Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6
February 1992; Arlene Perkins, 10 April 1991 and 4 February
1992; Ronald Besson, 10 April 1991; Kenneth Gilbert, 20
February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18
February 1992).
Illinois does receive a federal 7(C)(l) Consultation
Program Grant from OSHA (OSHA/Region 5, 1990; Arlene
Perkins, 4 February 1992; Gary Smith, 6 February 1992; and
Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).

This

grant supports a private sector consultative OSH program
administered by the state's Department of Commerce and
Community Affairs (DCCA) (Arlene Perkins, 4 February 1992).
DCCA is not a part of IDOL and is a political organization
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established by the previous Illinois governor, James
Thompson.

DCCA is the state governor's lead organization

for private sector economic development.

The department

uses the OSHA 7(c)(l) grant as an inducement to attract and
retain businesses within the state (Arlene Perkins, 4
February 1992; and OSHA/Region 5, 1990).
The OSHA 7(c)(l) funds are not allocated to DSIE or
enter state coffers for redistribution to DSIE through IDOL.
DCCA requested the grant as a means of serving the special
needs of businesses potentially relocating to the state.
The federal grant is also used to assist existing businesses
within Illinois to meet OSHA requirements (OSHA/Region V,
1990; Gary Smith, 6 February 1992; Arlene Perkins, 4
February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18
February 1992).
All DSIE funds are obtained purely from state revenues.
DSIE submits annual budgets to the IDOL budget off ice for
consolidation and submission through the Governor's office
to the state legislature.

A specific legislative line

allocation for DSIE does not exist.

DSIE defends its

proposal to the Secretary of IDOL who, in turn, defends
IDOL's budget request before the legislature.

The budget

request is subject to changes by IDOL, the Governor's
office, and the state legislature.

Once approved, funds

allocated to IDOL are redivided to the department's
divisions and offices.

DSIE does not receive any federal
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funds (Arlene Perkins, 10 April 1991 and 4 February 1992;
Ronald Besson, 10 April 1991; Gary Smith, 20 February 1991,
9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; Kenneth
Gilbert, 20 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet
Wright, 18 February 1992).

DSIE and IGR Communications

The majority of contacts between DSIE and OSHA are
informal.

The communication flow is horizontal.

DSIE is

not subject to the directions and requirements of OSHA.

The

relationship between DSIE and OSHA is not one of
subordinate/superior, nor is it an alliance.

Communications

between the two agencies are largely those of professionals
within a field of expertise discussing topics related to
their area of responsibilities.

Information related to OSHA

standards, advice on specific issues or situations, and
informational discussions on new federal legislation
routinely pass between the two agencies.

Although formal

communications do exist between DSIE and OSHA, such
communications are restricted to non-directive areas (e.g.,
training and acquisition of materials).

At no time is OSHA

permitted to direct, oversee, or in any manner become
involved in DSIE operations.
Close intergovernmental relations between DSIE and
OSHA's Region 5 office are characterized by informal
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contacts.

The Northern Regional Office of DSIE is located

two blocks from OSHA's Region 5 offices.

The Springfield

OSHA center is also readily accessible to the DSIE main
office.

The personnel of the federal and state offices know

each other and frequently contact each other informally
(Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991,
and 6 February 1992; Ronald Besson, 10 April 1991; Kenneth
Gilbert, 20 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet
Wright, 18 February 1992).
Jurisdictional disputes between OSHA and DSIE do not
occur.

A sharp demarcation of responsibility exists between

the public and private sectors of Illinois.

OSHA

administers the private sector OSH program and DSIE is
responsible for the state's public sector (Gary Smith, 20
February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February
1992; Ronald Besson, 10 April 1991; Kenneth Gilbert, 20
February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright, 18
February 1992).

The demarcation is enhanced since

contractors hired by the state and local governments are
considered under the jurisdiction of OSHA.

This potential

area of conflict between the federal and state agencies was
therefore resolved (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April
1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; Ronald Besson, 10
April 1991; Kenneth Gilbert, 20 February 1992; and Robert
Nichols and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).

74

The informal relationship between the state and federal
agencies is close.

Both agencies work with each other.

Inter-governmental referrals flow between the two.

DSIE

refers to OSHA any safety and health hazards DSIE compliance
inspectors observe within private sector operations.

OSHA

Region 5 does the same, in return, for the public sector.
Once referred by either office to the other, the matter is
considered closed by the referring office.

DSIE also

regularly contacts OSHA Region 5 for technical information
and advice (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10
April 1991, and 6 February 1992; Ronald Besson, 10 April
1991; Kenneth Gilbert, 20 February 1992; and Robert Nichols
and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).
DSIE maintains informal and formal contact with the
OSHA Federal Training Institute.

Formally, DSIE sends its

personnel to attend OSH courses offered through the
Institute.

Informally, DSIE personnel frequently call the

Institute to discuss problems, obtain clarification, or to
obtain advice (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991,
10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and
Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).
Local governments maintain both an informal and formal
relationship with DSIE.

The character of the relationship,

unlike the one with OSHA, shows the subordinate nature of
the local governments.

Formally, these governments request

training and assistance (e.g., advisory inspections) from
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the division.

The formal relationship is characterized by

the official nature of the contacts, usually in writing.
DSIE performs inspections, makes reports, reviews records,
and provides training (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April
1991, 10 April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols
and Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).
The informal relationship is more advisory and usually
involves telephone conversations.

Conversations might

relate to advice on a concern an employer may have about an
upcoming project. 8

It may simply be a personal discussion

about how the DSIE employee thinks a particular program may
progress (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10
April 1991, and 6 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and
Janet Wright, 18 February 1992).
DSIE began making professional contacts outside the
state within the last few years.

DSIE was relatively

isolated from other states' OSH public agencies until 1990.
DSIE representatives started attending the quarterly
meetings of the OSH State Plan Association (OSHSPA).
Association membership is limited to those states and
territories with OSHA approved OSH state plans.

Currently

this number is 23 states and 2 territories (Gary Smith, 20
February 1991, 9 April 1991, and 10 April 1991; Arlene
Perkins, 10 April 1991 and 4 February 1992; and OSHA Fact
Sheet, 1991).

Illinois attended as an interested party

(Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9 April 1991, 10 April 1991,
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and 16 February 1992; and Robert Nichols and Janet Wright,
18 February 1992).
DSIE also visited the Kentucky Labor Cabinet in 1990.
Kentucky has an OSHA approved state plan similar to a
preliminary proposal DSIE personnel were discussing.

The

Kentucky Labor Cabinet continues to maintain an informal
relationship with DSIE (Gary Smith, 20 February 1991, 9
April 1991, and 10 April 1991).

Otherwise, DSIE does not

have working relationships with other states.

SUMMARY

Prior to 1970, OSH regulation and enforcement within
the public and private sectors were pursued by state
legislatures and bureaucrats.

State OSH programs and laws

reflected the concerns of the state populace and industry.
The states frequently incorporated industry standards into
their programs.

Each state's program, however, was separate

and different.

The states developed, enforced, and operated

the programs independent of one another and the federal
government.

The Congressional legislation of the

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 changed the focus
from initial actors, the states, to the federal government.
Congress passed the Act in response to labor union,
industry, and special interest group concerns about the
diversity and effectiveness of state programs.
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These groups

believed a centralized and standardized federal program
would resolve the problem.

The federal bureaucracies of the

Department of Labor and the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare supported the proposal.

Congress was receptive

and the general consensus supported a national OSH program.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was the
Congressional response.
The Act's statement of purpose contains references to
the Constitution's Commerce Clause and the federal mandate
to pursue the public's well-being.

The references enable

the federal government to circumvent restriction of federal
involvement within state jurisdictions.

The constitutional

ties, however, limit federal OSH oversight of state public
sectors.

The Act grants the federal oversight agency, OSHA,

public sector oversight of states voluntarily joining the
federal government program as OSHA Plan States.
The prior record of Illinois in OSH regulatory and code
legislation projects an image of a state whose OSH interests
coincide with the federal government.

The passage of the

OSH Act of 1970 offers state legislators and regulators the
opportunity to draw upon federal resources.

The Act

authorizes grants to investigate and develop a state program
matching the new federal program.

Training, materials, and

fifty percent of operating expenses are offered as
incentives to states to become OSHA Plan States.

The

benefits under the federal legislation seems clear.
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The

state benefits by reducing its outlay while addressing the
needs of worker constituents.
Illinois moved to accept the federal government's
offer.

Existing legislation was revised to align the state

with OSHA Plan State requirements.

A single organization

was established to head the state program and act as the
primary OSHA point of contact.

However quickly Illinois

appeared moving towards OSHA Plan State status, public
dissatisfaction with OSHA overtook the state.
The political costs associated with acting as a federal
proxy became more than the state's political leaders were
willing to accept.

Organized labor and business interests

were raising their voices against OSHA.

If the state became

an OSHA Plan State, the political costs would have serious
and detrimental impacts upon the state's political
leadership.
Not only would political costs be high, but so would
the state's financial burden.

The size of the required

program, covering both public and private sectors, the
number of businesses to be inspected, the associated
administrative support, and other factors demanded a fairly
sizable state operation.

The state's share of fifty percent

of the program costs was viewed as more than the state
legislature was willing to allocate.
The withdrawal of Illinois from the OSHA Plan State
Program left the state's private sector under federal
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control.

Legitimately, the only remaining sector for

Illinois to administer was the public sector.

Yet this

sector was largely ignored until 1985.
The ten year period between 1975 and 1985 saw a gradual
movement towards an active public sector OSH program.

There

was a movement towards a more professional government away
the existing political patronage system.

Dissatisfaction

with the old system, disenchantment with IIC, and an
increasing awareness of the need for an OSH program
contributed to the 1985 legislation of a professional public
sector OSH organization and program.

The result was the

Division of Safety Inspection and Education (DSIE) under the
Illinois Department of Labor (IDOL).
Court decisions also defined the scope of Illinois's
public sector OSH program.

The 1986 AFSCME and 1990 city of

Champaign cases led to broader powers and responsibilities
for the new state OSH organization.

The AFSCME decision

required coverage of all public sector employees within
Illinois; not just state employees.

The court decision for

the city of Champaign forced Illinois' legislature to
formally grant DSIE the ability and authority to promulgate
and enforce new OSH standards.
A long term advantage also exists.

Should the state

decide to reapply for OSHA State Plan status, the structure
exists to assume the new role.

Discussions within DSIE

periodically occur about the possibility of pursuing OSHA
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State Plan status.

These discussions remain relatively

informal due to the political and fiscal restrictions facing
the state.

Disagreement exists within DSIE about the

benefits, feasibility, and even the wiseness of such a move.
DSIE's first director, Mr. Jerald Pusch, established
the division as a mirror image of OSHA.

OSHA was

approximately fifteen years old and well established.
Regulations and directives already existed and were readily
available.

OSHA standards were in use throughout the

country and easily obtained.

Copying OSHA to structure DSIE

and to define its operations was the most cost effective and
efficient means available to the new director.

The time and

money necessary to develop and structure an entirely new
organization was unacceptable to the state legislature and
governor's office.

OSHA was an established organization,

OSHA standards were nationally accepted, and the federal
program's guidelines had already stood the test of legal
application and time.
end.

Copying was an expedient means to an

Copying OSHA also made it possible for DSIE to easily

draw upon OSHA's educational, technical, and informational
resources.
Although the division is a state level copy of OSHA,
DSIE is separate and independent of the federal agency.
DSIE's funding is through the state budgetary process and
does not include any federal financial assistance.

The

division is purely a state organization without federal
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oversight.

The division, although a state level copy of

OSHA, is not a functionary of OSHA and is autonomous of the
federal program.

Copying successful programs of other

government entities is an acceptable practice whether
discussing economic development, municipal organization, or
a myriad of other topics.

The federal government copies

state programs and the states copy each other and the
federal government.
The only true formal relationship between DSIE and OSHA
is for training.

DSIE uses the OSHA Federal Training

Institute as the primary source of instruction for division
personnel.

DSIE uses the training to enable its personnel

to effectively perform their duties.

DSIE enforcement

personnel positively progress within the division as they
gain OSH experience and knowledge.
Although the federal government provides the training
without charge, the state subsidizes its attendees with per
diem and training pay.

OSHA training is freely offered to

any OSH public sector agency.

Corporate personnel may also

attend, provided openings exist in the classes.

None of the

organizations attending the training reimburse the federal
government.

Relations, otherwise, between the two agencies

are characterized by informal communications.
DSIE and OSHA (represented by Region 5 of OSHA in
Chicago and by the Springfield OSHA office) know each other.
Information exchange is routine and the personnel of both
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organizations maintain friendly relations.

DSIE personnel

frequently informally contact their OSHA counterparts for
advice and technical data.
DSIE is a relatively new organization.

The history

leading to its enactment and empowerment provide an example
of a state weighing costs, dangers, benefits, as well as
attempting to determine the state's realm of responsibility.
Illinois selected to refrain from becoming an OSHA Plan
State.

The decision was the result of weighing the costs

involved with acceptance and refusal.
federal oversight at a cost.

The state gained

The state lost autonomy to the

federal government for private sector OSH enforcement.

OSHA

control of the state's private sector could not be avoided.
OSHA would control the sector either through the state or
directly.

Illinois autonomy in the private sector for OSH

ended with the passage of the OSH Act of 1970.
Illinois did not lose public sector OSH autonomy.
Although largely ignored by the state until the mid-1980s,
the public sector was closed to OSHA.

Political necessity

led to enabling legislation forming the Division of Safety
Inspection and Education (DSIE) under the Illinois
Department of Labor (IDOL).

Pressures for a professional

state OSH agency had gained supporters within the state's
bureaucracy, legislature, unions, and the governor's office.
This concern was perceived and addressed by the state
without direction or requirement by the federal government.
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Currently, DSIE maintains itself separate from OSHA.
Although receiving educational and informational assistance
from OSHA, the division remains a state agency without
federal oversight.
DSIE supports the third framework, the state as an
autonomous entity.

The division is a state operation,

funded from state revenues, authorized by state law, with
oversight performed by the state legislature and Illinois
Department of Labor.

DSIE performs OSH enforcement,

education, inspection, and review for the public sector of
the state.

The division's area of responsibility is outside

the jurisdiction of OSHA which operates within Illinois'
private sector.
of OSHA.

DSIE operates separately and independently

The factors of autonomy and federal intrusion

clearly show the absence of federal oversight and control of
DSIE.

Illinois' public sector OSH program is autonomous of

the federal government.
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Chapter 3
CONCLUSION:
THE THIRD FRAMEWORK

The current theory of federalism/IGR fails to account
for the autonomous actions of states.

The theory's central

focus views the federal government as the primary actor in
federal-state relations.

States are portrayed as

functionaries or junior partners of the federal government.
These portrayals reflect the two frameworks of
federalism/IGR, the state as a bureaucratic layer and the
state as a federal ally.

Neither of the two frameworks

explain programs states pursue independently and separately
of the federal government.

FEDERALISM/IGR FRAMEWORKS

The first framework views states as a functionary level
within a definite federal hierarchy, the state as a
bureaucratic layer.

The framework perceives the state as a

formal part of a bureaucratic chain reaching from the
individual citizen to the federal government.

Within the

bureaucratic framework, the state operates as a functionary
of federal organizations.

Program criterion are strictly

defined and autonomy is severely constrained by the federal
government.

State participation may not be voluntary.
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Cooptation is one method the federal government exercises to
gain state participation.
The second framework, the state as a federal ally,
depicts states operating within broad guidelines investing
considerable room for interpretation.

The federal

government loosely prescribes state limits and
responsibilities.

Federal involvement and oversight are

less rigid than under the bureaucratic framework.

Federal-

state financial arrangements are normally one of the more
general categories of assistance and aid.

Ties still exist,

however, and the federal government retains authority and
oversight.

The state is a junior partner in the

arrangement.

The federal government dictates how funds are

obtained and expended, the restrictions and requirements
that apply, and the administrative controls the states must
follow.

The states, nonetheless, are able to pursue their

own political agendas so long as they fulfill the federal
goals.
I propose a third framework, the state as an autonomous
entity.

Autonomy and federal intrusion progress to the next

logical step of diminishing federal control and presence absence.

The federalism/IGR continuum has the extreme of

federal involvement outlined iri the state as a bureaucratic
layer.

The state is a functional part of the federal

bureaucracy with very limited, if any, autonomy.

The

federal government intrudes into the practices, procedures,
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and routine operations of its state proxy even to the lowest
level.

The middle area of the federalism/IGR continuum is

expressed by the framework of the state as a federal ally.
The state has greater autonomy and more freedom of action.
Federal intrusion is not as pervasive or stringent.

The

state, however, is not completely autonomous and free of
federal intrusion.

The federal government retains some

authority and control.

Although the state acts as a

partner, the reality suggests the federal government is
senior.
The third framework, the one proposed by this thesis,
carries autonomy and intrusion to the other extreme end of
the federalism/IGR continuum - full state autonomy and the
complete absence of federal intrusion.

The state pursues

its own interests separate and independent of the federal
government.

The state allocates and expends funds from

state revenues, not the federal government.

Federal

regulations do not mandate or require state action.
program oversight resides within the state.

Lastly,

The federal

government does not possess oversight authority.

The state

independently pursues a program or project to meet
constituency needs and concerns.

The programs are

established, funded, operated, and overseen by the state not the federal government.

Logically, these independent

state operations exist primarily within the public

87

sector.

The state's public sector is less vulnerable to

federal government interference.

AUTONOMY AND FEDERAL INTRUSION

The principal criterion underpinning the three
frameworks are the concepts of autonomy and federal
intrusion.

Autonomy addresses the freedom of action and

decision a state may possess.

Three areas of concern within

autonomy are the existence of federal financial structures,
regulatory requirements, and administrative constraints.
Financial structures assess the degree and type of federal
financial supports of a state.

Regulatory requirements

define the restrictions and limitations imposed by the
federal government.

Administrative constraints considers

the extent of federal bureaucratic arrangements the state
must accommodate.
The second concept, federal intrusion, frequently
overlaps autonomy.

Unlike autonomy's structural focus,

federal intrusion centralizes upon the depth of federal
activity into state operations and programs.
reveal the extent of federal intrusion.
information flow.

Two criterion

The first is

Information flow direction is categorized

as horizontal or vertical.

The nature of the information is

closely aligned with direction.

Vertical flow coincides

with formal communications and horizontal with informal
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communications.

The second is the extent by which federal

assistance and regulations intrude upon the decision-making
capacities of the state.

It assesses the degree to which

federal influence permeates the state organization.
The first framework, the state as a bureaucratic layer,
is characterized by limited or nonexistent autonomy.

The

parameters and restrictions on use and expenditure of
federal funds constrains the state.

Regulatory requirements

impose restrictions upon the state's operation of federal
programs.

Federal agencies outline administrative

constraints in strict terms.

An extreme example of the

first framework is federal government cooptation of state
operations (e.g., Civil Rights).

The framework defines the

state as a bureaucratic level working for the federal
government.
The second framework, the state as a federal ally, is
less restrained than the bureaucratic framework.
Substantial room for interpretation, broad guidelines, and
fairly liberal use of federal funds characterize the
framework.

The states are free to pursue their own agendas,

provided the federal agenda is fulfilled (e.g., California's
environmental programs and the federal EPA requirements).
The federal government retains a measure of control over
state operations.

The federal government mandates how funds

are obtained and expended, restrictions and requirements
related to the funds, and administrative controls.
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Although

the states are partners to the federal government, but they
remain junior in the relationship.
The two frameworks do not explain state pursuit of
programs and projects independent of the federal government.
The logical extension of autonomy and federal intrusion to
their absence establishes the third framework, the state as
an autonomous entity pursuing its own interest.

Federal

funds are not used, federal regulations do not require state
action, and the federal government does not possess
oversight authority.

The state elects to establish, fund,

operate, and oversee programs and projects without federal
interference (e.g., DSIE and OSHA).

Logically, independent

state operations exist within the public sector where the
federal government is less able to intrude.

INQUIRY RESPONSES

The current frameworks, the state as a bureaucratic
layer and the state as a federal ally, fail to explain
Illinois' operation of the Division of Safety Inspection and
Education (DSIE).
framework.

DSIE does not fit the criterion of either

The current federalism/IGR theory is unable to

categorize the operation since the necessary framework is
not conceptualized.

The theory lacks the ability to explain

the full range of activities within the federal system of
government.
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The first framework, the state as a bureaucratic layer,
is unable to accommodate the Illinois operation.
not a participant in the federal OSH program.

DSIE is

The division

does not perform operations on behalf of OSHA or any other
federal agency.

DSIE's program criterion are state generated

and not established, directed, or defined by the federal
government.

The division's autonomy of action is not

determined or constrained by OSHA.

DSIE operates within the

public sector while OSHA is restricted to the private sector
by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Public
Law 91-526, 1970).

Oversight of DSIE is performed by the

state of Illinois, not OSHA.
The second framework, the state as a federal ally, does
not correspond to the DSIE operation.

All of the same

observations for the first framework demonstrate the
inability of the second framework to define and categorize
DSIE.

Other measures further prevent categorizing DSIE as a

federal ally.

Federal financial structures do not directly

or indirectly support DSIE's occupational safety and health
(OSH) operations.

DSIE is not subject to OSHA's regulations

and administrative requirements.

The Occupational Safety

and Health Act of 1970 prohibits OSHA control of state
public sector OSH operations except within states which
voluntarily join the OSHA Plan State Program (Public Act 91526, 1970).
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Although DSIE is a mirror image of OSHA, the division
remains separate and autonomous.

The division uses many of

the OSHA standards and regulations in its program.
OSHA was well established, the regulations and directives
already existed and were readily available, and OSHA
standards were in use throughout the country and easily
obtained.

Copying OSHA was the most cost effective and

efficient method of establishing the new state agency.

The

time and money necessary to develop and structure an
entirely new organization was unacceptable to the state
legislature and governor's office.

Patterning OSHA also

made it possible for DSIE to easily draw upon OSHA's
educational, technical, and informational resources.

DSIE's

funding is through the state budgetary process and does not
include federal financial assistance.

The division,

although a state level image of OSHA, is not a functionary
of OSHA and is autonomous.

Emulating successful programs of

other government entities is a common practice, the federal
government replicates state programs and the states
duplicate programs of the federal government and other
states.
Illinois' public sector OSH agency conforms with the
criterion of the proposed third framework, the state as an
autonomous entity.

All the reasons preventing the

application of the first two frameworks are supportive of
the third.

DSIE is strictly funded through state revenues
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and is free of federal government regulations and
administrative requirements.

Federal intrusion is absent.

Information flow between DSIE and OSHA is horizontal and
informal.

Federal oversight is nonexistent and OSHA is

unable to define DSIE operations.
I asked three questions in my introduction:

1) Why did

Illinois pursue a separate OSH program?, 2) Is the Illinois
operation truly an autonomous program?, and 3) What type of
IGR communications are exchanged?

The answers to these

questions firmly establish the Illinois operation within the
framework of the state as an autonomous entity.

Why Did Illinois Pursue a Separate OSB Program?

Three questions, as stated earlier, are pertinent to
this thesis, although many could apply.
Illinois pursues a separate OSH program.

The first asks why
Prior to the OSH

Act of 1970, Illinois' involvement in OSH ranked the state
fifteenth in the nation for the number of OSH codes and
regulations (See Table 2-1) (Curington, 1988).

The Act

offered incentives to states voluntarily joining with OSHA
as OSHA Plan States.

The major incentive was federal

reimbursement of fifty percent of state OSH program costs.
Illinois' prior OSH interest seemingly coincided with the
federal agency's charter.

The added federal funding
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incentive appeared to offer an excellent opportunity to the
state.
Illinois moved towards joining the OSHA Plan State
Program.

The state legislature revised the Health and

Safety Act, Public Law 1935-36, aligning the state's OSH

program with the federal program (Illinois Public Act 87245, 1982).

The Illinois Industrial Commission (!IC) was

empowered to act as the state OSH action agency and OSHA
focal point.

Illinois submitted a plan to OSHA mirroring

the federal program in almost all aspects.

Preliminary

approval was granted by the federal agency pending the
approval of the Secretary of Labor (OSHA OAS Ltr w/Atchs,
1975).
Illinois, however, was unable to complete the process.
OSHA came under fire by industry and organized labor.

OSHA

adopted approximately 4400 job safety and health standards
within the first few months of operations.

The new

standards were drawn largely from existing federal
directives, industry codes, and consensus groups.

Most of

the criticism centered upon OSHA's enforcement program.
Industry complained of overbearing inspectors and harsh
reports.

Organized labor criticized OSHA for weak and

sporadic inspections which did not hold management strictly
to task (McGovern, 1987).

The outcry against OSHA was felt

in Congress, the federal Department of Labor, OSHA, and
Illinois.
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The state of Illinois' legislature and public officials
quickly perceived the potentially serious political costs.
Industry and organized labor interests maintained strong
political presences within the state.
press their OSH concerns.

Each were sure to

If Illinois assumed OSHA's

responsibilities, the state - not OSHA - would be the
primary focus of these conflicting interests.

The state

would also be held to OSHA's regulations and administrative
controls.
allure.

The federal funding incentive, likewise, lost its
The Illinois share of fifty percent of program

costs threatened to exceed the expenditure levels of the
pre-1970 state OSH program.

The state's political

leadership (e.g., state legislators and governor) became
adverse to continuing the pursuit of OSHA Plan State status.
Illinois requested withdrawal of the request in 1974
for political and financial reasons.

In June, 1975, the

Secretary of Labor officially accepted Illinois' withdrawal
(OSHA OAS Ltr w/Atchs, 1975).

The state gained and lost by

this action and under the OSH Act of 1970.

The Act empowers

OSHA to pursue OSH programs within the private sectors of
the states not designated OSHA Plan States (Public Law 91596, 1970).

This meant Illinois was not responsible for

funding and performing private sector OSH regulatory and
enforcement.

The state avoided the conflict between labor

and industry, abdicating responsibility to the federal
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government.

Yet, Illinois retained control over the state's

public sector.
State private sector OSH authority was preempted by
OSHA.

Federal government preemption was recognized by the

Illinois Supreme Court in Simpson v Industrial Commission
(Martin Marietta Corporation, Appellee) (91 Ill.2d 452, 440

N.E. 2d 94 (1982)).

The court ruled "the fact that the

Illinois Industrial Commission "held that on June 30, 1975,
its authority to enforce the Illinois Health and Safety Act
was effectively preempted by the Federal Occupational Safety
and Health Act (29

u.s.c.

sec 651 et. seq. (1976)" (Illinois

Public Act 87-245, 1982, p. 1, para 137).
Illinois' private sector OSH regulation and enforcement
ended with the case.

The court's decision brought closer

public and legislative scrutiny upon the IIC.

The IIC was

already under fire for its political patronage status and
seemingly inept handling of its various responsibilities.

A

movement within Illinois also existed for increased
professional administration of state programs.

The movement

called for professional administrators to manage complex
areas involving legal, moral, and ethical issues.
Concurrently, a variety of interest groups were increasing
pressure to enhance the public sector OSH program.

The

asbestos issue was one of the more publicized subjects which
rallied diverse interests calling for a strong state
program.

The IIC was unable to effectively deal with the
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increasing demand for OSH guidelines, education, and
inspection.
The Illinois legislature responded to these three
factors and revised the Safety Inspections and Education Act
in October, 1985 (Public Act 86-1435, 1985).

The Act

established DSIE under the Illinois Department of Labor
(IDOL).

DSIE is chartered as the state's public sector OSH

program agency.

Is the Illinois Operation Truly an Autonomous Program?

The second question assesses the autonomy question.

Is

the Illinois operation truly an autonomous program; separate
from OSHA?

As noted earlier, OSHA is unable to enforce its

OSH program within the public sector of Illinois.

The OSH

Act of 1970 specifically prohibits the federal agency from
operating within the public sectors of non-OSHA Plan States.
OSHA cannot enforce its regulations and requirements upon
the state program since DSIE operates strictly within the
public sector.
DSIE was deliberately established as a mirror image of
OSHA for expediency and ease.

OSHA was approximately

fifteen years old, its standards were commonly accepted, and
the basic guidelines existed and were readily available.
Copying OSHA was the most cost effective means available.
The time and money associated with developing and
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structuring a new organization was unacceptable to the
governor and state legislature.

The mirror image structure

also made it easier for the division to draw upon OSHA's
resources.

DSIE, however, remains independent of OSHA and

is strictly under the auspices of the state.
DSIE does not receive federal funding for its
operations.
Grant.

Illinois receives an OSHA 7(C)(l) Consultation

The grant is allocated to the Illinois Department of

Commerce and Community Affairs (DCCA) for private sector
consultations (OSHA/Region
with IDOL or DSIE.

v,

1990).

DCCA is not affiliated

The OSHA grant is used to attract and

assist private industry.
DSIE is funded through state revenues.

Each year, the

division's staff prepares a budget request for submission to
the Illinois Secretary of Labor.

The request is reviewed

and incorporated into the IDOL budget.

The IDOL budget is

submitted to the state's legislature through the governor's
office.

DSIE does not have a specific line allocation in

the state budget.

The division's funds are part of the

overall IDOL budget and are not, directly or indirectly,
derived from the federal government.
DSIE uses the OSHA Federal Training Center to obtain
training.

OSHA provides the training, without charge, to

any public agency with OSH responsibilities.

Private sector

corporations are also permitted to send personnel.

None of

the states and companies are required to reimburse the
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federal government agency.

Illinois does pay DSIE personnel

per diem and wages during their attendance at the center.
DSIE is not required to use OSHA standards.

The

division reviews OSHA standards and adopts those believed
desirable to the state.

DSIE officials assert every state

follows this practice.

This common activity provides a the

states with standards that are commonly accepted and often
proven by time and court challenges.

Copying also saves the

state revenue, lengthy development, and reduces the
potential for legal entanglements.

Federal standards are

often supplemented by state developed standards and those
adopted from industry.

DSIE, for example, adopted the 1910

General Industry Standards.
Illinois has not implemented a state developed
standard.

DSIE did initiate development of a new standard

in 1988 for fire departments and companies.

The standard's

development was dropped after a year because of strong
opposition and a court suit over the legal authority of DSIE
to promulgate new standards.

Local governments opposed the

standard for financial reasons, fire departments and
companies were suspicious of DSIE's reasons, and not all of
the fire unions were consulted which created ill will.

The

city of Champaign filed suit against DSIE to prevent the new
standard.

The city alleged DSIE did not have the legal

authority to develop and enforce new standards.
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The

political and legal pressure forced the division to drop the
proposal until resolution of the legal question.
DSIE, though it resembles OSHA, is a distinct and
separate agency.

DSIE is not responsible to the federal

government for public sector OSH activities.
support is solely from state revenues.

Financial

Oversight of the

agency is performed by IDOL and the state legislature, not
OSHA.

Finally, DSIE adopts only those OSHA guidelines,

standards, and regulations useful and applicable to the
state.

These are revised and reviewed as needed by DSIE.

What Type of IGR Communications are Exchanged?

My last question concerns communications.

What type of

!GR communications are exchanged between the state and
federal programs?

State and local?

between DSIE and OSHA are horizontal.

!GR communications
Vertical

communications are virtually nonexistent.
direct action by DSIE.

OSHA is unable to

DSIE communications with OSHA are

characterized by informal contacts to obtain advice and
information.

The contacts are exchanges between

professionals within a field of responsibility.

These

exchanges are similar to discussions of 'picket fence
federalism' in which professionals within a field of
expertise discuss topics affecting each other.

Picket fence

federalism, however, usually entails some form of formal
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linkages between the agencies employing these professionals.
Formal linkages do not exist between OSHA and DSIE.

The

personnel of DSIE and OSHA's offices (Region V and
Springfield), however, do know each other and routinely
converse on OSH topics.

The majority of the contacts are

performed by telephone.

Formal contact does exist, but

strictly for training allocations.
The relationship between DSIE and local governments is
both horizontal and vertical.

DSIE maintains a formal

relationship characterized by the official nature of the
contacts.

DSIE performs inspections, prepares reports,

reviews records, and provides training.

Informally, local

government officials and DSIE personnel discuss OSH issues.
Telephone conversations frequently occur related to advice
on a local government official's concerns or the progress of
legislation or particular programs.
Illinois operates within the third framework, the state
as an autonomous entity, for its public sector OSH program.
The state responded to the need for a public sector OSH
program and the concerns of the various interests within
Illinois' borders.

The case study firmly and clearly

demonstrates the validity and reliability of the proposed
framework.

Consistency can only be established through the

application of the proposed framework to other state
operations.
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SUMMARY

The current federalism/IGR frameworks provide us with
only a limited understanding of federal-state relations.
They do not provide us with a full continuum of
explanations.

The state as a bureaucratic layer provides us

with an extreme view of autonomy and federal intrusion.

The

second framework, the state as a federal layer, rests within
the middle area of federal-state relations.

Beyond this

framework lies an area largely ignored by scholars.

A third

framework is necessary to provide the researcher with the
full spectrum of possible explanations from one extreme of
the continuum to the other.

Autonomy and federal intrusion

provide the main criterion for defining the federal-state
relationship.

They must be carried to their logical

extremes - fully autonomous state involvement and the
absence of federal intrusion - necessitating the formulation
of a third explanative framework.

The state as an

autonomous entity satisfies this need.
State autonomy is a reality.

States retain the ability

to respond independently, even in this day of a strong and
centralized federal government.
into new arenas of operation.

State autonomy is moving
Technology and the demands of

our rapidly changing society creates new opportunities for
states.

The accelerating pace of scientific discoveries and

their subsequent applications often require changes to old
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political responses, as well as new and innovative
approaches.

American society itself is changing.

New

pressures are placed upon society and the political system.
These changes in society and science will continue to grow
and expand.

Flexible and innovative government is a

necessity if the needs and concerns of citizens are to be
met.

The federal government is a critical player and will,

no doubt, continue as a significant actor into the future.
The states, however, are closer to their constituents.
State leaders are able to allocate resources quicker than
the federal government to meet the concerns and needs of
their constituents.

States are also able to concentrate

their resources easier because their populations and
geographic types are smaller and less diverse.
The ability of states to act as autonomous entities is
not new.

States are the first bastions of political action.

Local needs and concerns are first expressed within state
and local governments.

The political leaders of these

polities are responsible to their electorate.

They can

often address issues through the powers of their offices.
Therefore, states are the first arena of political change not Washington D.C.

It is critical to remember that each

state's needs and concerns are not necessarily shared with
other states.
Nonetheless, if enough states address an issue,
political pressure is sufficient, and if there exists strong
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public interest and support - Congress usually reacts.
States are the first arena of change, but the federal
government retains the charge to address national issues.
If a national consensus exists, the federal government can
play a legitimate role.

Until such a consensus is

discerned, states can often effectively respond to the
concerns and needs expressed by their constituencies.
Second, states often establish programs to address
areas of concern not covered by federal government programs.
Since each state is different, the concerns and needs of a
state may not be fully addressed by a federal program.

The

ability of the federal government to respond to an issue may
be limited by legal, constitutional, and legislative
restrictions.

These gaps in program coverage are often

addressed by state programs.
Third, states are also constitutional powers however
much the Congress may impinge upon state rights.

The

confusion caused by ambiguous and seemingly opposing parts
of the Constitution contributes to the conflict within
federal-state relations.

States are not generally

acquiescent to federal encroachment and often carry their
case to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court established

itself as the final arbitrator of disputes over
interpretations of the Constitution.

Court decisions,

however, contradict themselves adding to the confusion.

104

The

decisions of the court supported states as well as the
federal government.
This thesis demonstrates the applicability of the third
framework to IGR and Federalism.

States do pursue their own

interests free of federal entanglements.

States will

establish and operate programs and projects without federal
funds, oversight, or direction to pursue such objectives.
The states' authority to address the concerns and welfare of
their constituents is expressed within the Constitution of
the United States.
The growth of a powerful and centralized authority the federal government - overshadows efforts of the
individual states.

The public and special interest groups

increasingly look to Washington D.C. to answer their
problems and concerns.

Yet states retain the ability to

respond within their own borders.

The states are often the

better level of government to address constituent interests.
I endeavored to look at one independent operation
established, funded, and operated by the state of Illinois.
The Division of Safety Inspection and Education (DSIE)
provides a strong case study to explain and represent the
concept of 'The State as an Autonomous Entity.'
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ROTES
1

Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) are
presented as a single theory for the purposes of this
thesis. Federalism provides the structural outline of
the levels of American government. IGR describes the
types of communication, focusing upon the two main
linear flows - vertical and horizontal, between levels
of government. The two combined provide a relatively
clear guide for evaluating and discussing governmental
relationships.

2

The landmark works of Elazar, Wright, and Osborne are the
focus of my review. The authors and these specific
books are widely cited by other writers within the
field of Public Administration. The reviewed books
form the foundation for other publications by their
authors.

3

The continuum of the frameworks of federalism is best
visualized using a pen. The pen has two ends or
extremes, a top and bottom. If we visualize the top
end as the first framework, the state as a bureaucratic
layer, we start to understand the continuum expressed
by autonomy and federal intrusion. The criteria of
autonomy demonstrates minimal state autonomy while
federal intrusion is maximized. The second framework,
the state as a federal ally, is somewhat in the middle
of our fictitious pen. Some measure of state autonomy
is present and federal intrusion is reduced. However,
a balance or equality between the two criterion may not
exist. The two frameworks are known and discussed
within the literature of federalism. However, we
failed to identify and define the bottom, or point, of
our pen. This extreme, or end of our pen, is the
subject of the thesis. As we pass along our imaginary
pen from the top to the bottom, we see increasing state
autonomy and decreasing federal intrusion. Once these
two criterion reach the bottom of our pen, their values
are reversed. State autonomy is maximized and federal
intrusion is minimized.

4

The book, Implementation Theory and Practice; Toward a
Third Generation, by Goggin and et al is cited.
I
researched the book to determine why government
establishes and implements programs with restrictions.
Although the book discusses implementation theory, it
is presented within the context of the existing system
of interaction between the federal and lower levels of
government.
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5

Clear definitions of public versus private sectors are
difficult to apply to actual cases. Every definition
has weak points and exceptions.
I do not expect mine
to be exempt. However, for the purposes of this
thesis, the public sector is defined as legislative,
enforcement, and regulatory operations of state and
local governments within the government itself or as
relates to government services. The private sector
embodies all activities and organizations which exist
outside the government structure (e.g., private
companies).

6

The Supreme Court decision in National League of Cities
v. Usury prevented federal intervention within the
public sector operations of a state/local government.
This was reversed by Garcia v. San Antonio Transit
Authority.

7

The term 'states', as used in the thesis, corresponds
with the definition contained in the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970. The act defines state
as "a State of he United States, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American
Samoa, Guam, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands" (Public Law 91-596, 1970, Section 3(7)).

8

An employer, for the purposes of this thesis, is a
governmental department, commission, division, agency,
or other government organization, with facilities
and/or public sector employees.
The term, as relates
to the public sector, does not include private sector
contractors operating on behalf of a public sector
employer.
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Appendix 1
INTERVIEWS
Name

Position

Ronald Bessona

OSHA, Region 5, Litigation
Enforcement Section; Chicago,
Illinois. Solicitor.
Interview:
10 April 1991 (Telephone).

Kenneth Gilbert

OSHA, Region 5, Federal-State
Operations Division; Chicago,
Illinois. Assistant Regional
Administrator (Acting).
Interview:
20 February 1992 (Telephone).

Robert Nichols

IDOL, DSIE; Springfield, Illinois.
Southern Region Area Manager.
Interview:
18 February 1992 (Joint
and in person with Janet Wright).

Arlene Perkinsa

OSHA, Directorate of Federal/State
Operations, State Programs,
Washington D.C. Program Analyst.
Interviews:
10 April 1991 and
4 February 1992 (Telephone).

Sherlie Scisma

IIC; Springfield, Illinois. Support
Staff Member. No longer affiliated
with IIC.
Interview: 26 September
1991 (Telephone).

Gary Smitha

IDOL, DSIE; Chicago, Illinois.
Northern Region Area Manager.
Interviews: 20 February 1991,
9 April 1991, 10 April 1991, and
6 February 1992 (Telephone).

Jan Wright

IDOL, DSIE; Springfield, Illinois.
Administrative Assistant to the
Division Manager.
Interview:
18 February 1992 (Joint and in person
with Robert Nichols).

NOTE:

ainterviews conducted in 1991. The 1991
questionnaire not included in Appendix 2.
questions were similar.
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However,

Appendix 2
INTERVIEW QUESTIONSa

Respondent Information

1.

What is your formal relationship to OSH?

2.

What is the full title of your position?

3.

What is your function in the agency?

4.

How long have you been with the agency?

5.

What other positions have you had within the agency?

6.

Did you hold other jobs or positions before joining the
agency?

If so, what where they?

7.

What is your educational level?

8.

Have you received technical training for your position?
If so, what and where?

OSH Activity Specific Information - OSHA Representatives

1.

Is there a requirement for a state's public sector to
follow OSHA of 1970?

Is so, what is the requirement

and what outlines the requirement?
2.

How would you characterize the Federal/State
relationship:

Directive, Partnership, Independent?

Why?
3.

Not all states are OSHA Plan States.

Could you explain

why states would and would not wish to participate in
the program?
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4.

Who administers OSHA within the private sector of nonOSHA Plan States?

5.

Are there OSHA Plan States for the public sector alone?
Which states?

6.

Why only the public sector?

Are there OSHA Plan States for the private sector
alone?

7.

Public Sector?

Which states?

Why only the private sector?

In how many states does OSHA administer the private
sector without state involvement?

Public sector?

Both

sectors?
8.

How was OSH administered prior to OSHA of 1970?

9.

Illinois withdrew its request to become an OSHA Plan
State.

What can you relate regarding to the events

leading to this action as pertains to your agency?
10.

Does OSHA administer OSH within the state of Illinois?
Which sectors?

11.

Does OSHA provide the state of Illinois financial aid
and assistance for OSH?

12.

What kind?

The state of Illinois established the Division of
Safety Inspection and Education within the Illinois
Department of Labor.
this agency?

13.

Does OSHA maintain relations with

What kind?

Does the Illinois Division of Safety Inspection and
Education receive any form of financial assistance from
OSHA?

14.

Does OSHA receive reports from the Illinois Division?
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15.

What is the authority of OSHA as relates to the
activities and administration of the Illinois Division
of Safety Inspection and Education?

16.

Has OSHA been reapproached by the state of Illinois
about OSHA Plan State status?

17.

If so, how and when?

How are reports of infractions handled when they are
within the Illinois public sector?

18.

How credible is the public sector OSH program within
Illinois?

OSH Activity Specific Information - State Representatives

1.

Is there a requirement for a state's public sector to
follow OSHA of 1970?

Is so, what is the requirement

and what outlines the requirement?
2.

How would you characterize the Federal/State
relationship:

Directive, Partnership, Independent?

Why?
4.

How was OSH administered within Illinois prior to OSHA
of 1970?

5.

What was the legislation?

Agency(ies)?

Illinois withdrew its request to become an OSHA Plan
State.

What can you relate regarding to the events

leading up to this action?
a.

Why did Illinois initiate the proposal to become an
OSHA Plan State?

b.

What benefits did the state expect?
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c.

How was the program to be administered?

d.

Which agency was responsible for OSH?

e.

Was the agency civil service/professional or was
the leadership and personnel politically appointed?

f.

Why did Illinois take action to withdraw the
application?

6.

Following the formal withdrawal of the Illinois
proposal and until the establishment of the current
public sector program; what transpired?
a.

What agency assumed responsibility over what
sectors of the state's economy?

b.

How was OSH administered by the state agency?

c.

Was there a clear dividing line between state and
federal jurisdictions?

d.

What was the character of the relationship between
the state agency and OSHA?

7.

The Illinois Industrial Commission was legislatively
responsible for OSH activities within the state:
a.

Upon what basis were !IC members selected?
Political?

b.

What was the general background and qualifications
of the !IC personnel?

c.

How credible was the !IC?

d.

How effective was the !IC?

e.

How was the role of the !IC in OSH perceived by the
state political leadership?
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8.

In the case of Simpson v Industrial Commission (Martin
Marietta Corporation, appellee), the Illinois Supreme
Court recognized "the fact that the Illinois Industrial
Commission "held that on June 30, 1975, its authority
to enforce the Illinois Health and Safety Act was
effectively preempted

by the Federal Occupational

Safety and Health Act."
a.

Was the IIC actively regulating the private sector?
Public Sector?

b.

What impact did this decision make?

c.

How as the credibility of IIC and the Illinois OSH
program affected?

9.

In October 1985, the state legislature revised the
"Safety Inspection and Education Act" establishing DSIE
within IDOL:
a.

What caused this revision?

b.

Who were the major proponents (groups and
individuals)?

c.

Why was DSIE placed under IDOL?

d.

Upon what basis are DSIE members selected?
Political?

e.

What is the general background and qualifications
of DSIE personnel?

f.

What sector(s) of the state economy does DSIE have
jurisdiction?
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10.

In 1985, AFSCME filed suit against IDOL and DSIE:
a.

Why was the suit filed?

b.

What was the intent of the state legislature
regarding DSIE versus the interpretation of AFSCME
and the court?

c.
11.

What was the impact of this suit?

Does OSHA administer OSH within the state of Illinois?
Which sectors?

12.

Does the state of Illinois receive any financial aid
and assistance from OSHA?

13.

What kind?

Does the Illinois Division of Safety Inspection and
Education receive any form of financial assistance from
OSHA?

14.

How is DSIE funded?

What budgetary process?

15.

How is financial oversight of DSIE accomplished?

16.

Does Illinois provide a public sector OSH program
because of the possibility of withholding of federal
assistance in other areas?

17.

Other than state legislation, is there any federal
legislation requiring the state pursue a public sector
program?

18.

Does the state feel the OSH Act of 1970 requires a
state agency like DSIE for other than OSHA Plan States?

19.

Is DSIE required to follow or administer OSHA
regulations and standards?
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20.

Where is the dividing line between the jurisdictions of
OSHA and DSIE within Illinois?

21.

Do they overlap?

If DSIE did not agree to an OSHA requirement and
pursued its own policy, what would likely happen?

22.

How much autonomy does Illinois have to pursue its own
OSH concerns?

23.

Why does DSIE so closely resemble OSHA?

What function

does this perform?
24.

Did the structure of DSIE result from federal direction
or suggestions?

25.

As a response to federal concerns?

Is the state able to change, delete, add, increase,
decrease, or otherwise change OSHA
regulations/standards to meet Illinois needs?

26.

Why does DSIE use OSHA standards and regulations?

To

what degree do these standards and regulations permeate
the organization?
27.

Has DSIE attempted to develop its own standards and
regulations?

28.

What occurred?

What differences are there between the state and
federal programs?

29.

Does the Illinois Division send reports to OSHA?

30.

How is the flow of information between OSHA and DSIE
characterized?

31.

What type of information is exchanged?

What is the authority of OSHA as relates to the
activities and administration of the Illinois Division
of Safety Inspection and Education?
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32.

If the OSHA intervened within Illinois' public sector,
how would the state react?

33.

Has the state of Illinois reapproached OSHA about OSHA
Plan State status?

34.

If so, how and when?

How are reports of infractions handled when they are
within the Illinois private sector?

35.

How are DSIE personnel selected and what background
must they possess?

36.

How are DSIE personnel trained to perform their tasks?
a.

How is this training obtained?

b.

Who pays?

c.

Is DSIE required to send its personnel to the OSHA
school?

d.

Is DSIE required to reciprocate in any manner for
this training?

37.

How are local government OSH programs administered?
a.

Are there local government OSH administrators?

b.

Who performs inspections, education, and employee
complaint investigations?

c.

How are inspection reports handled?
complaints?

d.

Employee

Education requests?

Do the local governments provide any financial
reimbursement to the state for DSIE activities
within their jurisdictions?

38.

How does DSIE, or would DSIE, handle a private sector
company's request for a consultation visit?
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39.

DSIE is authorized to levy fines upon employers if
deemed necessary:
a.

What is the fine structure?

b.

How is a fine applied?

c.

Does the fine increase with time for non-

Satisfied?

Appealed?

compliance?
d.

Can other funds to a local government be withheld
until compliance?

e.

NOTE:

What types of funds?

Have fines been levied?

For what and to whom?

aThe interviews were informal and permitted the
respondent to respond to the depth each felt
appropriate. Not all questions were asked of each
respondent. Specific questions were extracted
depending upon the agency and position of the
individual. Often, the answer to one question
precluded the necessity of asking other questions.
This frequently occurred due to the breath and depth
of the responses provided by the interviewees to
questions asked early in the interviews. At the end
of each interview, the respondent was encouraged to
provide any additional information or insight they
felt might be beneficial to my understanding of the
topic and case.
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